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COPYRIGHT'S COMMUNICATIONS POLICY
Timothy Wu*

INTRODUCTION
There is something for everyone to dislike about early twenty-first
century copyright. Owners of content say that newer and better
technologies have made it too easy to be a pirate. Easy copying, they
say, threatens the basic incentive to create new works; new rights and
remedies are needed to restore the balance. Academic critics instead
complain that a growing copyright gives content owners dangerous
levels of control over expressive works. In one version of this
argument, this growth threatens the creativity and progress that
copyright is supposed to foster; in another, it represents an "enclosure
movement" that threatens basic freedoms of expression.1 Copyright,
these critics argue, has wandered beyond its proper boundaries. They
also contend that the balance must be restored.
What all these arguments have in common is a focus on copyright's
"authorship" function. Copyright policy, in this view, is fundamentally
about providing a balance of incentives for authors to effectuate one
of several possible goals, such as progress of science, democratic
governance, or the system of free expression. Few disagree that these
are the goals; the main disagreement is over what means best serve
these ends.
Yet the recent history of copyright forces us to ask whether this
debate can capture what is right and wrong with the law. Both sides

* Associate Professor of Law, University of Virginia. B.Sc. 1995, McGill University, J.D.
1998, Harvard. I nm grateful for help and comments from Julie Cohen, Becky Eisenberg,
Jane Ginsburg, Scott Hemphill, Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, Lee Kovarsky, Douglas
Lichtman, Clarisa Long, David Nimmer, Peter Menell, Robert Merges, Richard Posner,
Glen Robinson, Lawrence Lessig, Tom Nachbar, Peggy Radin, and Phil Weiser. Excellent
research assistance was provided by Jeremy Thompson and Lee Kovarksy. Finally, I am
grateful for feedback from the participants in workshops at Columbia Law School, Stanford
Law School, University of Michigan Law School, Boalt Hall, Harvard Law Berkman Center,
the 2003 Telecommunications Policy and Research Conference, the American Law &
Economics Associations Conference. I owe special consideration to the Birdwood Faculty
retreat at the University of Virginia Law School.

1. An exemplar of the latter view is Yohai Benkler, Free as the Air to Common Use:
First A mendment Constraints on Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 354,
358 (1999) (arguing that legal rules "enclosing" information risk the diversity of information
sources and threaten freedom of speech); the former view, LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE
FuTURE OF IDEAS 85-97 (2001) (endorsing an "information commons" from which authors
may draw for creative inputs).
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point to the same problem: a tragedy of authorship caused by their
opponents. Critics of copyright say that aggressive over-enforcement
deters those who would borrow from others to create, such as music
samplers, satirists, and filmmakers. Copyright's backers warn,
conversely, that piracy threatens the very livelihood of the artist and
creative industries. The story of twin tragedies, however, creates an
indeterminate debate. Both positions have difficulty demonstrating
empirically, as opposed to anecdotally, that either overprotection or
piracy has stilled the engines of creativity. Any putative change in
copyright protection can both be defended as a necessary creative
incentive and attacked as an unnecessary control.
This Article suggests that the main challenges for twenty first
century copyright are not challenges of authorship policy, but rather
new and harder problems for copyright's communications policy:
copyright's poorly understood role in regulating competition among
rival disseminators. Since its inception, copyright has set important
baselines upon which publishers and their modern equivalents do
business. As the pace of technological change accelerates, copyright's
role in setting the conditions for competition is quickly becoming
more important, even challenging for primacy the significance of
copyright's encouragement of authorship.
None of this is to say that the debate over authorship is a sham, or
that copyright's role in incentivizing authorship is unimportant. The
law, I suggest, can be usefully understood in a modular fashion: as
comprised of both authorship and communication regimes with often
independent functions. The first regime is the familiar system, run by
the courts, that grants exclusive rights to encourage creativity. The
second is a messier regulatory regime comprised mainly of the sections
of copyright that have always perplexed copyright theorists and have
never fit the central theme of author-incentives. This de facto
communications regime runs through the legislative process and the
courts, and largely takes the form of industry specific liability rules,
court created immunities, and special accommodations.
The study of copyright's communications policy has both a
descriptive and a normative payoff. First, it helps us understand both
the existing copyright code and the history of twentieth century
copyright. Much of the existing copyright code is difficult to describe
as a device for providing incentives to create new works. That
description may fit various "core" doctrines that consume the bulk of
scholarly attention, such as the idea/expression dichotomy, term limits,
and parts of the fair use doctrine.2 But the copyright code is also full of
complex compulsory licensing schemes and technologically specific

2. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 102, 107, 302-04 (2000).
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immunities.3 The link to authorship in such sections is unclear at best.
I suggest it will be useful to understand these apparent anomalies as
part of copyright's regulation of competing disseminators.
The observation is confirmed by copyright in the twentieth
century, where the law has played a recurring role in competition
between incumbent and challenger disseminators. What follows
characterizes the copyright's communications policy into two modes
{"classic" and "new") corresponding to two time periods. In the first,
from 1900-1976, the copyright's classic communications regime
evolved through a series of long and extensive conflicts between
competitive rivals, such as cable and broadcast, radio and song-writers,
and the early recording players and sheet music publishers. This era is
characterized by judicial reluctance, even in the face of precedent, to
extend to incumbents rights of copyright that might be used for
market advantage over a technologically advanced rival. The statutory
result were the series of government mandated access schemes, known
to copyright lawyers as "compulsory licenses," that make up the bulk
of the copyright code and are otherwise difficult to characterize.
The second period, from the 1976 Act onward, has witnessed the
emergence of a "new" communications policy. New sections of the law
regulating competition among disseminators have emerged as a
response to a transformation in the nature of the challenge to
incumbents. Faced with an alliance between passive but enabling
technologists and non-commercial but infringing users, copyright
owners have convinced Congress to enact two new streams of
copyright law. The first is a set of rules for managing the relationship
between technologists - largely, the electronics and internet
industries - and traditional disseminating industries, typically in the
form of judicial or legislative safeharbors. The second stream is a
series of "anti-piracy" rules that seek to put direct controls on user
behavior.
The study of copyright's role in regulating competition, I suggest,
reveals a copyright that theorists may hardly recognize. It is not that
scholars are unaware of copyright's role in communications policy the importance of "dissemination" has always been recognized as a
goal of copyright.4 The point, rather, is that the author-centrism of
copyright theory has left little basis to evaluate or criticize copyright's
decisions that create communications policy.
There is, finally, a normative payoff from the study of copyright's
role in communications regulation. In the last several decades, the

3. These sections are described in depth in Part LC, infra.
4. See, e.g. , Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) ("[The
copyright holder's) private motivation must ultimately serve the cause of promoting broad
public availability of literature, music, and the other arts.").
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United States has generally endorsed a model of open, competitive
innovation as its national communications policy. It is, in other words,
a point of agreement that neither government nor industry
monopolists are well situated to choose what technologies or firms the
nation should use to communicate, now or in the future. Copyright, as
it grows in importance, should not be exempt from such principles.
Few would disagree that the basic vision of competitive innovation is
an attractive vision. Although many may disagree on how the goal
might best be achieved, it cannot be reached without an awareness of
the role that copyright plays in setting national communications
policy. That requires that judges and policymakers further develop an
appreciation of copyright's effects on parties other than authors.
The Article is divided into three parts. The first describes
American copyright's "classic" communications policy. After situating
the communications perspective in traditional copyright theory, it
explains where the legal expression of copyright's communications
regime can be found, and details its evolution during the period of
1900-1976. The second part is primarily theoretical. It provides tools,
taken from telecommunications and competition theory, for
understanding and analyzing the communications policies that
copyright has implemented. The third part describes copyright's
"new" communications policy, which has evolved post-1976. It closes
on a normative note, suggesting how courts and lawmakers can decide
copyright issues with an eye to their effects for competition and
national communications policy.
I.

A DESCRIPTIVE MODEL OF COPYRIGHT
A. Author-Centrism

Copyright theory is traditionally depicted as a long conflict
between two dueling theories. In accounts now very familiar to
copyright theorists, the first of these warring theories is Anglo
American and describes the purposes of copyright as "utilitarian" or
"economic."5 It premises the existence of copyright on market failure.6
Copyright exists to provide incentives for authors to produce works
and thereby avoid the underproduction that might otherwise result.7
Under this theory copyright law is ultimately similar to other forms of
5. See, e.g., William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of
Copyright Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325, 326 (1989) ("Striking the correct balance between
access and incentives is the central problem in copyright law. For copyright law to promote
economic efficiency, its principal legal doctrines must, at least approximately, maximize the
benefits from creating additional works minus both the losses from limiting access and the
costs of administering copyright protection.").
6. See id. at 333-34.
7. See id. at 327-28.
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economic legislation; it is Lord Macaulay's "tax on readers for the
purpose of giving a bounty to writers. "8
The rival to the Anglo-American view resides mainly on the
Continent and is known in the United States as the natural rights
theory of copyright. It suggests that authors have a moral right to the
fruits of their labors: copyright is granted because the author deserves
it.9 One version of this idea says that authors should be rewarded for
the value they contribute to society.10 Another suggests a natural link
between creation and ownership: the author owns his (smaller)
creation in just the manner that God owns his (slightly larger)
creation. What you create is yours: '"to every cow her calf. "'11
Today this traditional debate has taken on a modern gloss. Natural
rights theories, in the United States at least, have retreated to the
status of foil, used more to accuse than to defend.12 The dominant
starting point for most American scholarship is an incentives theory,
or the "incentive/access" paradigm, which is the idea that copyright
expresses some balance between encouraging creation of expressive
works, while providing for adequate access to the work for new
authors and others. As Mark Lemley expresses the conventional
wisdom, "both the United States Constitution and judicial decisions
seem to acknowledge the primacy of incentive theory in justifying
intellectual property. "13
Taking incentive theory as a baseline, writers have moved in two
major directions, emphasizing the private and public benefits of

8. Thomas Babington Macaulay, Speech Delivered to British House of Commons
Regarding 1841 Copyright Bill (Feb. 5, 1841), in MACAULAY'S SPEECHES ON COPYRIGHT
AND LINCOLN'S ADDRESS AT COOPER UNION 25 (Charles Robert Gaston ed., 1914).
9. See Alfred C. Yen, Restoring the Natural Law: Copyright as Labor and Possession, 5 1
OHIO ST. L.J. 517, 522-24 nn.27-44 (1990) (detailing the evolution o f natural rights theory
through Roman and English Law). For an example of a contemporary natural rights theory,
see Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and Individualism in the
Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 Y ALE L.J. 1533, 1535 (1993) (arguing that a return
to natural rights theory would protect free speech interests).
10. See MARSHALL LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAW 58 (3d ed. 1999).
11. AUGUSTINE BIRRELL, SEVEN LECTURES ON THE LAW AND HISTORY OF
COPYRIGHT IN BOOKS 42 (1899).
12. Much recent writing on natural rights theories of copyright seeks not to defend it,
but rather to accuse Congress or the courts of wrongly reinstituting a natural rights regime
through expansion of copyright. See, e.g., JAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS, SOFTWARE, AND
SPLEENS: LAW AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE INFORMATION SOCIETY 56-59 (1996);
MARK ROSE, AUTHORS AND OWNERS: THE INVENTION OF COPYRIGHT 125-28 (1993);
Gordon, supra note 9, at 1540 (arguing that courts have mistakenly interpreted the natural
law theory of copyright and afforded too much protection to authors at the expense of free
speech interests); Peter Jaszi, Toward a Theory of Copyright: The Metamorphoses of
"Authorship '', 1991 DUKE L.J. 455, 471-90; see also Yen, supra note 9, at 529-39 (stressing
that natural law concepts are inherent in copyright law).
13. Mark A. Lemley, The Economics Of Improvement In Intellectual Property Law, 75
TEX. L. REV. 989, 993 (1997).
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copyright, respectively. A group of economic theorists have
supplemented basic incentives theories with work stressing the static
benefits of copyright as a form of property, relying generally on the
utility of assigning property rights to owners.14 The second cluster of
theories stresses public rationales other than market failure for
encouraging authorship. Enjoying great academic, if not j udicial,
popularity are theories that conceive of copyright's incentive system as
part of the larger system of free expression associated with the First
Amendment.15 Another group treats copyright's incentive structure as
playing a role in promoting a republican system of govemance.16
This story is familiar and greatly interesting to copyright theorists,
but can be misleading. The access/incentives paradigm and the
theories that follow it are principally theories that center on the author
and the creation or ownership of expressive works. They have much
less to say about disseminators and the economics of distribution.
They are, in short, author-centric theories of copyright. And although
theories of authorship are a crucial part of copyright theory, they
provide only a partial description of the law.
This basic contention is supported by a casual read of the copyright
code. Large portions of the statute are difficult to describe as parts of
a property scheme balanced to encourage the creation of new works.
That description may fit certain core sections such as the
idea/expression dichotomy in section 102 of title 17, the exclusive
rights expressed in section 106 and general exceptions such as the fair
use doctrine, found in section 107. But large parts - indeed the
greatest volume of actual text - fail to conform to this model. These
parts are rather devoted to industry specific liability rules (compulsory
licensing schemes) and immunities - sections that are ugly,

14. See, e.g., WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAw 85-123 (2003) (describing various economic
roles played by copyrights, mainly related to the reduction of transaction costs); Wendy J.
Gordon, An Inquiry into the Merits of Copyright: The Challenges of Consistency, Consent,
and Encouragement Theory, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1343, 1435-49 (1989) (pointing to "authors'
entitlements as the starting points from which markets evolve"); Robert P. Merges, Are You
Making Fun of Me?: Notes on Market Failure and the Parody Defense in Copyright, 21
AIPLA Q.J. 305, 306 (1993) (stating that economic analysis of copyright has "progressed
beyond the point where a crude 'incentive' story passes for analysis in every case").
15. See, e.g., Benkler, supra note 1, at 391-94; Jed Rubenfeld, The Freedom of
Imagination: Copyright's Constitutionality, 112 YALE L.J. 4 (2002) (evaluating copyright on a
theory of free speech centered on the "freedom of imagination"); Rebecca Tushnet,
Copyright As A Model For Free Speech Law: What Copyright Has In Common With Anti
Pornography Laws, Campaign Finance Reform, And Telecommunications Regulation, 42
B.C. L. REV. 1 (2001). Despite the academic attention, arguments calling for greater scrutiny
of copyright under the First Amendment have been nearly without exception rejected by the
Supreme Court, most recently in Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 198 (2003) and earlier in
Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 560 (1985).
16. See, e.g., William W. Fisher III, Reconstructing the Fair Use Doctrine, 101 HARV. L.
REV. 1659, 1691 (1988); Netanel, infra note 381, at 347.
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complicated, and obscure.17 They include the mechanical license in
section 115, the secondary transmission license (for cable television) in
section 111, and particular immunities for particular groups, such as
internet service providers in section 512 and digital audio recording
devices in sections 1001-1010. Their relationship to a putative author's
incentives to create would seem at best indirect; the schemes, on their
face, seem to have much more to do with managing competition
between industry rivals.
Purely author-centric theories also have trouble explaining the
"secondary" costs of copyright: those imposed on actors other than
authors and consumers. Incentive theories are interested in two
categories of copyright's effects: the benefits that accrue to authors
and the corresponding costs imposed on consumers and new creators.
Yet it is evident that much of the costs of copyright are borne by other
actors. One need only look to those who object to copyright to see
where costs are felt. The costs of piracy are invariably a complaint of
incumbent disseminators, whereas new market entrants for their part
complain about being squashed by incumbents.18 Finally, tele
communications firms and electronics manufacturers complain about
the costs they bear when enlisted to enforce copyright schemes of
contributory liability.19 These secondary costs of copyright, together
with the large sections of the code described above, are data points
that classic authorship theories have difficultly explaining.
The point is not that scholars are unaware of the secondary costs of
copyright or unacquainted with the difficult sections of the copyright
code just described. Scholars like Paul Goldstein, Jane Ginsburg and
Jessica Litman have long portrayed copyright's history as a struggle to
adapt to new technologies.20 Meanwhile, numerous copyright scholars
from the San Francisco Bay Area and other high-tech zones, like
Pamela Samuelson, Mark Lemley, Julie Cohen, Peter Jaszi and James
Boyle, have been arguing for the last decade that copyright may
17. These sections enjoy only passing attention in copyright casebooks. See, e.g. ,
NIMMER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON COPYRIGHT 225-28, 556 (6th ed. 2000)
(including five pages on compulsory licensing in a book of 1230 pages). The difficulty and
tedium of teaching statutory licenses, however, explains this cursory treatment.
18. See, e.g., Lee Gomes, In Name of Innovation Some Let Technology Get A way With
Murder, WALL ST. J., May 5, 2003, at B l (discussing whether technological innovation
provides an excuse for piracy); Jack Kapica, Copyright Litigation is Threatening Innovation,
THE GLOBE AND MAIL, Dec. 11, 2003, at B13 (suggesting that copyright threatens
innovation).
19. See, e.g., Mike Musgrove, Copyfight Renewal: Owners of Digital Devices Sue to
Assert the Right to Record, WASH. POST, June 7, 2002, at E l (detailing fight between
electronics firms and Hollywood).
20. See PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT'S HIGHWAY: FROM GUTENBERG TO THE
CELESTIAL JUKEBOX (rev. ed., Stanford Univ. Press 2003); Jane Ginsburg, Copyright and
Control Over New Technologies of Dissemination, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1613, 1622 (2001);
Jessica Litman, Digital Copyright (2001).
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threaten technological innovation.21 And closest to the methods of this
Article, economic-oriented copyright theorists, including Robert
Merges, Randal Picker, Richard Posner, William Landes and Douglas
Lichtman are in the midst of an ongoing effort to generate secondary
economic explanations for aspects of copyright that do not fit the
central incentives story.22 What follows is both indebted and
complementary to these efforts to undercover secondary purposes of
the copyright law.
What differentiates this Article is its focus on the role and history
of disseminators, as opposed to authors, under copyright law. The
descriptive theory following is also an effort to consolidate many of
the various insights from the last decade of scholarship into a larger
theory. Whether called the regulatory or communications theory of
copyright, it aims to consolidate our understanding of the regulation of
both disseminators and authors to give a more complete account of
what copyright is doing and why. If what follows is correct, copyright's
role in communications policy is both only partially understood, and
also likely to have increasing importance as the scope of copyright
increases.
B.

A Descriptive Theory of Copyright Law

It is not wrong or inaccurate to say that copyright is a system of
property rights designed to encourage creation. I argue, however, that
one can also usefully describe copyright as a system that has evolved
to manage competition among natural rivals in the world of packaged
information. To see what this means, consider the world of packaged
information as comprised primarily of three groups: authors,
disseminators, and consumers of expressive works.

21. A few representative examples include James Boyle, The Second Enclosure
Movement and the Construction of the Public Domain, 66 LAW AND CON rEMP. PROBS. 33
(2003); Julie E. Cohen, Copyright and the Perfect Curve, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1799 (2000);
Peter Jaszi, Caught in the Net of Copyright, 75 OR. L. REV. 299 (1996); Mark Lemley, The
Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75 TEX. L. REV. 989 (1997); Pamela
Samuelson, Regulation of Technologies to Protect Copyrighted Works, 39 COMMUNICATIONS
OF THE ACM (1996). Some have also reversed the question and asked whether copyright
itself will fall victim to forces of technological change. See, e.g. , Eben Moglen, Anarchism
Triumphant: Free Software and the Death of Copyright, First Monday, August 1999.
22. Principal examples include LANDES & POSNER, supra note 14, at 17-18; Douglas
Lichtman, Copyright as a Rule of Evidence, 52 DUKE L.J. 683, 705 (2003) (describing
sections of copyright as motivated by an evidentiary function); Randal C. Picker, Copyright
as Entry Policy: The Case of Digital Distribution, 47 ANTITRUST BULL. 423 (2002); Michael
Abramowicz, Copyright Redundancy 9 (March 2003), at http://ssm.com/abstract_id=374580
(describing much of copyright as motivated by an interest in preventing redundancy and rent
dissipation).
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FIGURE 1.1: COPYRIGHT RELATIONSHIPS
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The thesis is that copyright law emerges as a byproduct of conflict
between the parties pictured here. All of these parties - incumbent
and new authors, incumbent and new disseminators, and consumers are in relationships made up of repeat interactions fraught with
potential for conflict and abusive behavior. Although conflicts may
arise between any of the pictured parties,23 the law focuses on two
relationships: those amongst new and existing authors and those
amongst incumbent and challenger disseminators. The first is familiar:
it is copyright's authorship regime. The second is less so: it is
copyright's communications regime - so named because it regulates
the same parties (disseminators) as communications law, and because
it confronts similar problems. As presented in this paper, moreover,
the term "communications policy" is taken simply to mean a special
case of competition, or antitrust policy as between disseminators.24
23. The contest between freelance writers and those who distribute their materials
online is an example of the relationship between existing authors and new disseminators.
See, e.g. , New York Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483, 487-88 (2001) (concerning a clash over
the newspaper's sale of copyrighted text to be retrievable in a database search). So, to .a
degree, was the conflict between composers and music publishers and the radio broadcast
industry. See infra notes 109-159 and accompanying text.
24. For the view that communications policy is an application of antitrust principles in a
particular context, see, e.g., J. Gregory Sidak, Telecommunications in Jericho, 81 CAL. L.
REV. 1209, 1237-38 (1993) (book review) (arguing for the consolidation of reasoning in
communications law and antitrust). The context is distinguished by two factors: first, the
frequent existence of bottleneck infrastructures, see infra Part II.A, and second, the
existence of fixed statutory policies that occasionally mandate deviations from the goal of
maximizing consumer welfare, such as the goals of "universal service" (communications
technologies should be available to every citizen), see generally Milton Mueller, Universal
Service in Telephone History: A Reconstruction, 17 TELECOMM. POL'Y 352, 356 (1993), and
"localism" (support for local media outlets over national), see, e.g., 47 U.S.C.A. § 521(2)
(2001) (discussing importance of local control over cable).
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FIGURE 1.2: PROBLEMATIC BEHAVIOR IN THE WORLD OF
COPYRIGHT
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What kinds of problems emerge amongst new and ex1stmg
players? Copyright law has evolved to deal with two recurrent types of
abusive behavior. The first is misappropriation, which arises because
each "new" actor (whether author or disseminator) has the capability
to appropriate and free ride off of the investments made by existing
actors, whether in expressive works, distribution channels, or
otherwise.25 The mirror image of misappropriation is lock-out
behavior, which arises from the capability of an existing actor to block
market entry and exclude or control potential new competitors. The

25. Wendy Gordon describes this as the "restitutionary impulse." See Wendy J. Gordon,
On Owning Information: Intellectual Property and the Restitutionary Impulse, 78 VA. L. REV.
149, 150-51 (1992); see also Richard A. Posner, Misappropriation: A Dirge, 40 Hous. L. REV.
621, 621-25 (2003) (arguing that misappropriation "is a candidate to be the overarching
principle that would rationalize intellectual property law as a whole . . . [but] is too sprawling
a concept to serve as the organizing principle").
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various legal schemes engineered to prevent these two private wrongs
can be understood to comprise much of what we call copyright law.
Nothing here assumes that the actors pictured will always behave
in abusive ways. Not every new writer is a plagiarist nor is every
incumbent industry bent on destroying emerging competitors. But in
this view copyright has, as Oliver Wendell Holmes suggested
generally, evolved to meet systematic misbehavior.26
Copyright's authorship regime needs little introduction because it
is already the focus of most scholarly attention. It is only worth noting
that copyright handles the misappropriation problem among authors
in very clever ways. Copyright for authors has created a doctrinal
"floor" and "ceiling," where the floor is the requirement of originality,
and the ceiling is the lack of protection for the ideas underlying
expression.27 Together, and joined by the fair use exception,28 these
core doctrines create the familiar idea of a balance that allows certain
but not all forms of appropriation. This is a familiar subject to anyone
who has studied copyright and needs little repetition. Conversely,
copyright's communications regime, which manages similar problems
among disseminators, is far less studied and understood. The
remainder of this Part is an effort to remedy that imbalance.
C.

The Communications Regime Revealed

Copyright's communications regime, its management of rival
disseminators, is not a recent phenomenon, for it actually predates
copyright's authorship regime. The management of competition
among publishers, copyright historians tell us, was actually the earliest
purpose of copyright. Historian Ray Patterson explains, " [H]istory
shows us [that] copyright began as a publisher's right, a right which
functioned in the interest of the publisher, with no concern for the
author."29

26. See Mr. Justice Holmes, Address at Boston University School of Law (Jan. 8, 1 897),
in The Path ofthe Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 459 (1897). This was also a view of law stated
by Epicurus: "The laws exist for the sake of the wise, not that they may not do wrong, but
that they may not suffer it." Epicurus, The Extant Writings of Epicurus, in THE STOIC AND
EPICUREAN PinLOSOPHERS 51 ( C. Bailey trans., Whitney J. Oates ed., 1940).
27. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000).
28. See Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure, 30 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y 253, 256
(1983).
29. LYMAN RAY PATTERSON, COPYRIGHT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 8 (1968).
Some, such as Jane Ginsburg, would argue that the word copyright should not be understood
other than as a right subsisting in an author, and that to speak of a publisher's or stationer's
copyright is a contradiction in terms. I take no position on this issue, but note that some
historians do use the term copyright in reference to the early rights of publishers. See id. at
43; see also BENJAMIN KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF COPYRIGHT 5 (1967) (using the
term in this manner).

November 2004]

Copyright 's Communications Policy

289

According to copyright historians the stationers' (publishers')
rights in the 1500s and 1600s, later codified in the Statute of Anne,30
allocated among the stationers the exclusive rights to copy a given
manuscript (the copy rights).31 The original copyrights functioned as a
device that eliminated direct competition between stationers and were
generally unconcerned with authorial matters.32 As Joseph
Loewenstein explains, the earliest ancestors of copyright were "a
privilege conferred by the guild on one of its members, part of an
imperfect but not ineffective system by which the guild sought to
preserve internal order. "33
Matters have changed less in the last 400 years than one might
think. Copyright, as in the seventeenth century, is still quite concerned
with maintaining order among the rival stationers of our era. The only
difference is that we call the stationers disseminators, and believe
despite evidence to the contrary that modern copyright is primarily an
author's right.
1.

Statutory Modules

The most obvious and important manifestations of copyright's
communication regime take up most of title 17 of the United States
Code. They are the complex statutory management schemes that
balance the respective rights of dissemination industries. The rules
embedded in title 17 are modules of communications policy specific to
a particular industry and, usually, to a specific historical context. Each
is complicated and lengthy, and collectively make for perhaps the least
glamorous parts of copyright.
Most of the modules occupy section 111 to section 122 of title 17 of
the United States code. Each has much in common, speaking to and
managing competition between potential communications rivals:
broadcast and cable, broadcast and satellite, phonograph and Internet,
and so on. The most common way of achieving a compromise between
rivals is a "compulsory licensing" scheme: laws that force the copyright
owner to provide open and non-discriminatory access to a work in
exchange for a fixed payment. Modern modules, such as the section
512 scheme for internet service providers, create immunities schemes.
30. Act for the Encouragement of Learning, 1710, 8 Ann., c. 19 (Eng.).
31. For a discussion of the early history involving the Stationers' Copyright and the
Statute of Anne, see L. Ray Patterson & Craig Joyce, Copyright in 1791: An Essay
Concerning the Founders' View of the Copyright Power Granted to Congress in A rticle 1,
Section 8, Clause 8 of the U.S. Constitution, 52 EMORY L.J. 909, 913-28 (2003).
32. See KAPLAN, supra note 29, at 4 ("(The stationers' copyrights] did not, however,
stand on any notion of original composition, for they might be granted for ancient as well as
new works.").
33. JOSEPH E. LOEWENSTEIN, THE AUTHOR'S DUE: PRINTING AND THE PREHISTORY
OF COPYRIGHT 29 (2002).
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A summary description of the major modules and their features
follows:
a. Secondary transmissions by cable operators and others. This is an
extremely complex compulsory license scheme enacted in 1976.
Congress enacted it in response to cable operators' unpaid usage of
broadcast signals from the 1950s to the 1970s. It requires
rebroadcasters - principally, cable operators, but also hotels and
apartment complexes - to pay a fixed fee for a license to rebroadcast
copyrighted materials and is found in title 17, section 111 of the U.S.
Code.
b. Digital audio transmissionlwebcasting license. A provision
requiring Internet "radio stations" to pay a statutory fee in order to
rebroadcast copyrighted materials is found in section 114.
c. The "mechanical license." This compulsory license allows anyone
wanting to record a composed song to pay a fixed fee to the composer.
It also allows recording of "cover" versions of famous songs. The
mechanical license is found in section 115.
d. Jukebox negotiated licenses. This section mandates negotiation
for the licenses to play sound recordings of nondramatic musical
works on jukeboxes and is located in section 116.
e. Public broadcast license. Section 118 of the Copyright Act
creates a compulsory license for the use of published nondramatic
musical works and published pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works in
connection with noncommercial broadcasting.
f Satellite retransmissions of television signals. A compulsory
license scheme, similar to that found in section 111, applies specifically
to satellite rebroadcast of content both from broadcasters and from
cable operators. It is found in section 119.
g. Satellite retransmissions of television signals into local markets. A
bargain between the satellite, broadcast, and cable industries, section
122 grants satellite rebroadcasters a free (no royalty) compulsory
license for local broadcasting, provided they agree to carry all
television broadcast stations located within the local market.34
h. Immunity for ISPs transmitting or hosting infringing material. A
compromise reached in 1998 between Internet Service Providers
("ISPs") and content owners grants ISPs varying levels of immunity
for the storage or transmission of copyrighted content. ISPs are
generally immune from the transmission of infringing content, while
search engines and those who host content are subject to a duty to
take or delink infringing material upon notice. These rules are found
in section 512 of title 17.

34. See Ellen P. Goodman, Bargains in the Information Marketplace: The Use of
Government Subsidies to Regulate New Media, 1 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. 217 (2002).
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i. Immunity for producers of digital audio recording devices.
Section 1008 contains a grant of immunity to manufacturers of digital
audio recording devices (like "DATs") on condition of the payment of
a royalty on each sale.
The existence and significance of the statutory modules cannot be
questioned. The cable industry, just to take one example, based its
early existence on access to copyrighted works, and has paid billions in
access fees to broadcasters.35 Yet where do these modules come from
and what purpose do they serve?
Unlike the familiar judicial process behind most of copyright's
authorship decision, the process behind copyright's communications
regime is a much murkier subject. The complex statutory modules
described above are the product of a different and somewhat unusual
institutional process: a mixed procedure of the federal courts
(particularly the Supreme Court), and a separate process of mediated
copyright settlement. The usual but not invariable results are the
modules that are the active mainstay of copyright' s communications
regime.
2.

Copyright's Evolution

Scholarly depictions of the evolution of copyright in the twentieth
century generally fall into two schools. The first is optimistic, and
explicitly or implicitly inspired by the economist Harold Demsetz.36 It
regards the expansion of copyright as a series of efficiency-promoting
adjustments made necessary by changes in technology and the
increased importance of the information economy. Legislatures, in this
model, have enacted new copyright laws to bring the benefits of
copyright propertization to new industries. Robert Merges writes, for
example, that "through a combination of judicial adaptation and
legislative updates, the copyright system has - so far, at least - been
up to the job at every tum."37
The second school is pessimistic, and depicts the expansion of
copyright with the aid of classic public choice theory. Inspired by
Mancur Olsen rather than Demsetz, it sees copyright owners as a
discrete and highly organized group whose lobbying acumen has led to

35. The cable industry had paid about $2.3 billion as of 1997 for access to broadcast
signals. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, A REVIEW OF THE COPYRIGHT LICENSING REGIMES
COVERING RETRANSMISSION OF BROADCAST SIGNALS 20 (1997) (citing testimony of the
National Cable Television Association).
36. See, e.g., GOLDSTEIN, supra note 20; Robert Merges, One Hundred Years of
Solicitude: Intellectual Property Law, 1900-2000, 88 CAL. L. REV. 2187 (2000); see generally
Saul Levmore, Property's Uneasy Path and Expanding Future, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 81 (2003).
37. Merges, supra note 36, at 2191.
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a century of advantageous legislation.38 Consumers, disorganized and
disparate, end up as the principal victims. As Jessica Litman wrote in
1989, "Each time we rely on current stakeholders to agree on a
statutory scheme, they produce a scheme designed to protect
themselves against the rest of us. "39
Most scholars - even those associated with one or another school
- will admit that copyright's evolution reflects elements of both
approaches. What I present here is not a general theory of copyright's
evolution, but rather a theory that is primarily designed to explain the
evolution and origins of copyright's liability rules. (A more general
theory of the evolution of liability rules is planned but not found in
this Article). These, I suggest, can be best understood through a model
of conflict that sees law emerging as a political reaction to changes in
relative prices resulting from technological change. This borrows from
similar simple models of conflict between more and less efficient
producers recurrent in trade economics.
3.

A Model of Conflict

The central modules of copyright's classic communications policy
have arisen out of conflict - out of bitter, public battles between
incumbent and challenger disseminators who often seem determined
to do or say anything to get their way. That, at least, is the repeated
pattern of the twentieth century and, if the first few years are any
indication, it will persist as a part of the twenty-first century copyright
landscape.
The twentieth century witnessed decades-long battles between, to
name just a few examples, the recording industry and sheet music
publishers, cable companies
and broadcasters, electronics
manufacturers and recording companies, and the recording industry
and online music distributors. But why do these conflicts arise? Are
they a permanent part of the landscape?
This Section argues that given only very basic assumptions, public
conflicts among rival disseminators are nearly inevitable and therefore
a permanent problem for copyright's regulation of packaged
information. We can predict that conflicts between incumbent and
challenger disseminators will arise so long as two things are true: first,
that more efficient technologies of dissemination will be invented and
second, that there exists the possibility, but not the certainty, of
convincing government to provide laws that can be used against a
competitor. I suggest, in other words, that the conflicts that arise in the

38. See, e.g. , LESSIG, supra note 1; Jessica Litman, Copyright Legislation and
Technological Change, 68 ORE. L. REV. 275 (1989).
39. Litman, supra note 38, at 359.
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copyright world are not much different from those in other areas
where government might act, if convinced, to protect market
competitors. For example, the conflicts between classes of
disseminators are conceptually similar to the conflicts that arise when
domestic industries face more efficient foreign competitors.40 The
difference is that the parties invoke or seek new copyright laws, rather
than tariffs and other trade barriers.
An incumbent disseminator industry sells expressive works using
existing technology. The industry's costs, including payments to
authors, result in supply curve S1• To simplify, assume that the
copyright law confers no ability to set a supra-competitive price, so
that that the price is determined by where supply meets demand, as
follows:41
FIGURE 2.1: THE INCUMBENT INDUSTRY ALONE
Price

Quantity
A challenger industry is any group of entities that enjoy an
advantage in the efficiency of dissemination (supply curve Sc). This
condition can arise for several reasons. The first reason derives from
any technological advantage in the delivery of content - either better
quality (like cable or piano rolls), or lower cost (like broadcasting or
online distribution).42 Either form of technological advantage can be
modeled as simply a more efficient supply curve. The second reason
derives from the challenger's ability to disseminate content less

40. See Joel R. Paul, Do International Trade Institutions Contribute to Economic Growth
and Development?, 44 VA. J. INT'L L. 285 (2003) (describing similar model).

41. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 21.5 (4th ed. 1992)
(observing that different estimates of the odds of favorable government action make
settlement of lawsuits less likely).
42. Some, including Scott Hemphill, suggest it is strange to model increased quality as a
more efficient supply curve, arguing that a product of increased quality should be modeled
as a new product with a separate demand curve. To clarify, the suggestion is that a better
quality TV can be compared to the old TV plus a cash supplement. This I think is a fair
representation of what is usually the reduced annoyance and greater enjoyment that comes
from a better quality product.
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expensively because it does not pay for the works itself. That may be
the case either because existing copyright law does not explicitly apply
(as was the case with early cable and gramophone technology) or
because of some capability to evade copyright law's requirement to
license the work (as in the example of online distribution). In either
case, part of the challenger's advantage in efficiency stems from what
is usually described as piracy.
FIGURE 2.2: THE CHALLENGE

Price

Quantity
But why does the arrival of a more efficient technological rival
create conflict? Conflict arises because of my second assumption: that
government can sometimes be convinced to protect the incumbent
industry, but not always, and not predictably. If the degree of
protection is difficult to predict and depends in part on investments in
persuasion, it makes sense for both the incumbent and the challenger
to invest in efforts to obtain a favorable outcome. These rival
investments in obtaining a favorable governmental action result in
some of the longest running conflicts in copyright history.43
More precisely, conflict arises in a form that public choice theorists
call a contest between "rent-protecting" and "rent-seeking" interests.
This is a contest where an incumbent dedicates resources to protecting
its favorable position against encroachment by other groups.44 The
incumbent holds a number of potential legal threats against any
challenger, including the imposition of incessant litigation costs,45 an
ability to convince regulators (like the Federal Communications

43. Cf James M. Buchanan, Rent Seeking and Profit Seeking, in TOWARD A THEORY OF
THE RENT-SEEKING SOCIETY 3, 9-11 (James M. Buchanan et al. eds., 1980) (explaining that
the possibility of government action encourages investments in efforts to obtain rents).
44. For an explication of rent-protecting in the context of public choice theory, see
Robert D. Tollison, Rent Seeking, in PERSPECTIVES ON PUBLIC CHOICE 506, 515-17 (Dennis
C. Mueller ed., 1997).
45. See Tim Wu, When Code Isn 't Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 679, 705 (2003).
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Commission (FCC)) to restrict the challenger,46 or lobbying for laws
that will put the challenger at a serious disadvantage.47
Part II of this Article describes in greater detail how copyright laws
and other laws can be used as a tool of foreclosure. Here we can set
forth the incumbent's potential strategies. There are two: the first is to
try eliminate the challenge by increasing the challenger's costs by, for
example, denying the challenger access to an essential input (the
copyrighted work). The result is pictured below, where the
challenger's supply curve is shifted to the uncompetitive S«. This is a
strategy akin to seeking trade protection through tariff or an import
ban. The second strategy is to co-opt the challenger: to allow the
challenger to sell at a price corresponding to its more efficient supply
curve, but to pay a tax to the incumbent that transfers as much of its
producer surplus as possible. In either case the incumbent relies on
government assistance to achieve its desired result.
FIGURE 2.3: SUCCESSFUL ELIMINATION OF COMPETITION

Price

Quantity
The technological challenger, meanwhile, invests its own producer
surplus (based on its more efficient supply curve) in efforts to prevent
government from protecting the disseminator or increasing the
challenger's costs. Such investments can be as basic as defending
copyright litigation, but can also include more outlandish measures
such as using the antitrust law or devising better means of evading
copyright enforcement (a recent strategy).48
For all of these strategies, the critical assumption is that the form
and even the odds of favorable government's action will be hard to
predict. Imperfect information is the barrier to settlement, and the

46. See, e.g., infra note 223.
47. See Wu, supra note 45, at 705.
48. See generally, Wu, When Code Isn't Law, supra note 45,passim.
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unknown and unknowable is what the government will do.49
Conversely, if everyone knew what government was likely to do, or
even knew the odds of government acting one way or another,
settlement of copyright's communications disputes would be fast.
There are many reasons why government action will be hard to
predict when new technologies of dissemination are invented. First,
unlike, say, traffic accidents, there are relatively few inventions of
major new dissemination technologies - in the twentieth century, at
best about one per decade. There is therefore a thin market for paying
off challenger industries wielding new technologies. Second, unlike a
tort lawsuit, there are multiple government actors involved. Courts
using copyright law may take one side, Congress another; antitrust law
and the FCC make occasional cameo appearances.so As a result, the
odds of favorable government action are much harder to predict than
in the settlement of a run-of-the-mill lawsuit. This inherent and
historical unpredictability makes early settlement unlikely. Finally, not
only is the direction of government action difficult to predict, but so is
its effectiveness. Copyright enforcement can be costly and challenging.
The knowledge that government action may be of unpredictable
effectiveness increases the uncertainty that leads to copyright conflicts.
What would happen in the absence of any government rules,
regulations, decrees or other involvement? If the government denied
an incumbent any possibility of obtaining protection from a
technologically advanced challenger, then the incumbent's strategy
would depend on its capability for self-enforcement: its ability to
protect its products and its producer surplus by nonlegal means. For
example, in a world without government, broadcasters might have
prevented the cable industry from "stealing" its signals by using
physical force, or today, better scrambling of signals.st Even with a
copyright law, the recording industry currently uses nonlegal means to
increase the costs of distributing its products online.s2
The effectiveness of such self-enforcement is likely unpredictable,
and so total absence of government involvement would not necessarily
lead to peace and agreement between competing disseminators.

49. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 21.5 (4th ed. 1992)
(observing that different estimates of the odds of favorable government action make
settlement of lawsuits less likely).
50. For a discussion of FCC involvement in radio see infra notes 109-159 and
accompanying text. For a discussion of the involvement in the cable-broadcast dispute, see
infra notes 1 88-260.
51. Cf Lee Kovarsky, Technological Substitution and the Arms-Race Theory of
Copyright (draft on file with author) (arguing that copyright owners have a choice between
seeking self-protection, copyright protection, or both).
52 See Wu, supra note 45, at 743-45 (describing non-legal methods used by recording
industry against online music distribution).
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Again, what is most likely to lead to rapid settlement is predictable
government action with known effects in any direction.
From this discussion one might expect me to advocate greater
predictability in order to minimize investments in seeking government
favor, behavior that public choice theory considers wasteful "rent
seeking."53 B ut I have not argued here, as the classic rent-seeking
literature would, that such expenditures are wasteful or undesirable.
As Part II explains, the costs of rent-seeking may be worthwhile if it is
unclear which technology is actually better, and if the rent-seeking
process eventually allows the better technology to win out. Predictable
government action - a hypothetical copyright dictator - could
eliminate all conflict by choosing a winner but could also pick the
wrong winner. So the costs of rent-seeking may be justified by a better
substantive result.
To summarize: the existence of unpredictable copyright protection
and new technologies should produce long contests to obtain
favorable governmental decisions. Because it is not obvious what
government will do, incumbent industries - e.g., broadcasters, the
recording industry, and sheet-music publishers, - can be expected to
end up in long contests with challengers to persuade government to
take favorable action. The result of such contests is copyright's de
facto communications regime. But this is quite a bare description. In
the Sections that follow, we can see what government has done in the
face of conflicts between challengers and incumbents, and how
copyright's communications policy has actually developed.
D.

Communications Policy,

1.

The Birth of the Recording Industry

1 900-1976

The birth of the recording industry in the late 1890s and early
1900s is the model, for better of for worse, for copyright's
communications policy in the twentieth century. The recording
industry, predating today's online distribution via cable and other
media, was the original technological free rider - the first to build a
business whose success depended, in part, on the incidence of
copyright arbitrage.54
The recording industry pioneers were the manufacturers of piano
rolls and of "talking machines," or early record players. Early versions

53. See Buchanan, supra note 43, at 4 ("The term rent seeking is designed to describe
behavior in institutional settings where individual efforts to maximize value generate social
waste rather than social surplus." (emphasis in original)).
54. For a discussion on copyright arbitrage, see Michael J. Meurer, Copyright Law and
Price Discrimination, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 55 (2001) (applying economic models of price
discrimination to copyright law).
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of these technologies were introduced in the late 1890s.55 By 1902, at
least a million piano rolls, each representing a copyrighted song, were
in distribution.56 The record industry grew even faster: by 1899, 2.8
million records had been sold.57 These mechanical reproductions were
produced without paying any licensing fees to the owners of the
respective copyrights.58
Technologically, the player piano and the record player were each
the "receiver" for a new form of mass media - the paper piano roll
and the record, respectively. A single purchase of copyrighted sheet
music could be transformed by the recording industry into rolls and
records that reached tens of thousands of listeners. As a result, the
success of mechanical recordings sparked a conflict with the
incumbent industry: publishers of sheet music.59
a. The rhetoric. The rhetoric of the early recording industry conflict
is both independently fascinating and a template for other conflicts
that followed. The incumbent owners of copyrights adopted a theme
familiar to modern ears: they depicted the recording industry as
irresponsible pirates whose reckless copying of music threatened to
destroy American creativity. What was, in retrospect, a battle over the
impact of new technology was at that time portrayed as a threat to
traditional values and artistic development. As composer John Phillip
Sousa informed Congress:
These talking machines are going to ruin the artistic development of
music in this country. When I was a boy . . . in front of every house in the
summer evenings you would find young people together singing the
songs of the day or the old songs. To-day you hear these infernal
machines going night and day. We will not have a vocal chord left. The
vocal chords will be eliminated by a process of evolution, as was the tail
of man when he came from the ape.60

55. See Jessica Litman, War Stories, 20 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 337, 350 nn.69-70
(2002) (noting that composers did not earn royalties from these distribution mechanisms).
56. See White-Smith Music Publ'g Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1, 9 (1908) ("The record
discloses that in the year 1902 . . . from one million to one million and a half of such
perforated musical rolls . . . were made in this country in that year.").
57. ANDRE MILLARD, AMERICA ON RECORD: A HISTORY OF RECORDED SOUND 49
(1995).
58. See White-Smith, 209 U.S. at 16-18; Litman, supra note 55, at 350 n.70.
59. There were a number of legal battles between the two camps. See, e.g., White-Smith,
209 U.S. 1, 18 (holding that 1897 Act did not assign composers right to piano roll
reproduction of composition); Stern v. Rosey, 17 App. D.C. 562, 564-66 (1901) (refusing to
hold phonograph presentation of sounds as a "copy" within the meaning of existing statute);
Kennedy v. McTammany, 33 F. 584, 584-85 (C.C.D. Mass. 1888) (holding that perforated
strips of paper used in tune-producing organettes do not violate copyrighted music of the
same tune).
60. Arguments Before the Comms. on Patents of the S. & H.R., Conjointly, on the Bills S.
6330 and H.R. 19,853, to Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright, 59th Cong.
24 (1906) [hereinafter 1906 Hearings] (statement of John Philip Sousa), reprinted in 4
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Another line of argument portrayed the recording industry ("The
Talking Machine Trust") as a dishonest, monopolistic business. A
model letter written for composers stated the case:
[W]hat is the result? I see my compositions . . . stolen bodily by the
phonograph trust and piano-player combination, and ground out daily
from thousands of cylinders, disks, and rolls, without paying me or any of
us one single, solitary penny . . . [Congress must] assist in protecting me
against such robbery, such unfairness, and such a terrible disadvantage.61

A slightly more sophisticated argument presented the recording
industry's activities as a threat to the incentives to compose music in
the first place. In a 1907 letter to the New York Globe and Advertiser,
the Authors and Composers' Copyright League put things as follows:
[T]he "Talking Machine Trust" . . . with all the greed of a hungry wolf
seizes upon the composition and turns out countless records and
perforated rolls, thereby killing the sales, for it is a proven fact that as
soon as the penny talking machines reproduce a musical composition it is
dead as far as the public is concerned.
[Without copyright reform] the musical art and all other musical
industries in this country will languish, as the authors and composers, not
receiving any royalties on records, and their royalties on sheet music
decreasin� from year to year, will have no incentive to write or
compose. 2

How about the challengers - the recording industry? Sounding
themes also familiar today, the recording industry identified itself as
the inventing class, heroes of American ingenuity and engineering.
They portrayed the incumbent industry as a monopoly threat
interested only in destroying a technologically advanced rival.
Self-described inventor Howlett Davis, who testified before
Congress "without invitation from any source whatever,"63 depicted
the arts as necessarily dependent on inventors: "In all arts the work of
the inventor will be found at the foundation of the progress and
prosperity of the country."64 Inventors, he argued, serve the people.
"The farmer or the workingman," he argued, relies on his record

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 1909 COPYRIGHT ACT pt. H, at 24 (E. Fulton Brylawski &
Abe Goldman eds., 1976).
61. Hearings Before the Comms. on Patents ofthe S. & H.R. on Pending Bills to Amend
and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright, 60th Cong. 255 (1908) (hereinafter 1908
Hearings] (model Jetter to Congress in statement of John J. O'Connell) reprinted in 5
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 1909 COPYRIGHT ACT pt. K, at 255 (E. Fulton Brylawski &
Abe Goldman eds., 1976).
62 Id. at 257 (newspaper Jetter in statement of John J. O'Connell).
63. 1906 Hearings, supra note 60, at 97 (statement of G. Howlett Davis).
64. Id.
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player "to relax the tension of their daily labor."65 He condemned
expanded copyright as a plan to "take away from the inventor the
product of his brain and to deliver it over to the composer."66 "So far
as the mass of the people of this country is concerned, the work of the
composer is infinitesimal as compared with the work of the
inventor."67
Inventors also argued that an expanded copyright would defeat
their vested rights, both as an industry and, more particularly, the
vested rights of inventors holding patents to mechanical players.
Expanded copyright, Davis argued "practically depreciates or destroys
the marketable value of my inventions or machines . . . as well as
destroying in part or whole my existing patent rights."68 His view,
evidently, was that the patent grant included a right to be free from
copyrights that might interfere with the value of the patent.
A more strategic theme advanced by the early recording industry
played on contemporary fears of monopoly trusts, particularly those
with a foreign element. In a clever turn, much of the recording
industry mobilized against a single manufacturer of player pianos, the
lEolian Company. They argued that the demand for copyright
expansion had nothing to do with composer welfare, but was rather
part of a grand international conspiracy. Howlett Davis described the
alleged collusion between publishers and composers as "a complete
monopolistic octopus, in which the lEolian Company forms the head
and brains, the Music Publishers' Association the body, the
independent publishers the writhing arms, and the composers the
suckers and baiters. "69
A series of inflammatory 1 908 editorials in the newssheet "Musical
Age" depicted a sinister international "syndicate" agitating for
copyright's expansion.70 It asked: "who raises this hue and cry and
creates this clamorous demand for new and drastic [copyright]
legislation? Is it the author? [No] . . . It is the speculator and gambler."
After detailing the syndicate's origins in France (and in particular, its
connection to a shadowy figure named Lucien Vives), the lEolian
company was named as local outpost of the global conspiracy. "In this
country, it is the lEolian company which assumes the role of 'chief
speculator."'
A final argument, also present in contemporary debate, was that
the recording industry was actually helping composers by spurring the
65. Id. at 103-04.
66. Id. at 104.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 101.
69. Id at 98.
70. M. Dorian, The Men Behind, THE MUSICAL AGE, Feb. 29, 1908, at 76-77.
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sales of sheet music; hence, no change to copyright was needed. A
representative of the talking machine lobby stated that " [i]t is
impossible that there should be any sale of records of the composition
without there being a corresponding sale of the sheet music. Each may
help the other, but phonograph reproduction is certainly a powerful
stimulus to the sale of sheet music."71
This argument - that the new technology of dissemination will
ultimately aid composers irrespective of the level of copyright
protection granted to their works - remains a persistent theme in the
defense of challenger activity.
b. Copyright settlement. We are now in a position to understand the
legal course of events that led to settlement. The incumbents,
unsurprisingly, took the lead. Early on, publishers asked lower courts
to find piano rolls (1888) and records (1901) an infringement of
copyright rights.72 These efforts failed.73
The incumbents, making the piracy arguments detailed above, then
moved to Congress, achieving through a publishers' conference a draft
copyright bill that would have granted composers full rights in
mechanical recordings.74 At the same time, in 1906, a new effort was
made to obtain an appellate decision finding mechanical recordings to
be infringing copies. The test lawsuit was litigated all the way to the
Supreme Court: the now famous "piano-roll" case, White-Smith Music
Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co. 75
Unfortunately for the incumbents, the Supreme Court was
unwilling to extend copyright in the manner requested. It ruled that a
"copy" in the statute was a "reproduction or duplication of the
original," which the perforated paper roll evidently was not. In
hindsight it is clear that the decision could have gone either way.76 The
Court repeatedly relied on the fact that piano rolls were not visually
similar to sheet music - a curious means to adjudge the meaning of a
"copy" of an aural work.
71. 1908 Hearings, supra note 61, at 300 (statement of Frank L. Dyer).
72. See Stem v. Rosey, 17 App. D.C. 562, 564-66 (1901) (refusing to hold phonograph
presentation of sounds as a "copy" within the meaning of existing statute); Kennedy v.
McTammany, 33 F. 584, 584-85 (C.C.D. Mass 1888) (holding that perforated strips of paper
used in tune-producing organettes do not violate copyrighted music of the same tune).
73. See Stern, 17 App. D.C. at 564-66; Kennedy, 33 F. at 584-85.
74. See Litman, supra note 38, at 284-86.
75. 209 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1908).
76. The Court's holding in White-Smith was premised on the notion that piano rolls did
not constitute a physical copy of the work. White-Smith, 209 U.S. at 18. The Court did so
because the rolls were not directly accessible to humans, and did so over the objection of
Justice Holmes that "[o]n principle anything that mechanically reproduces that collocation
of sounds ought to be held a copy . . . . " 209 U.S. at 20 (Holmes, J., concurring). This
conception of fixation was quickly overturned by the copyright statute in 1909. See 17 U.S.C.
§ 101 (2000) (defining fixation); see also Douglas Lichtman, Copyright as a Rule of Evidence,
52 DUKE L.J. 683, 716 n.140 (2003) (discussing meaning of fixation).
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Many have criticized the purported formalism of the White-Smith
Court.77 Reflecting early twentieth century practice, the Court
declined to explain the reasons or policy behind its decision. But the
decision, whether consciously or not, put the Court squarely in the
midst of communications policy. The doctrinal and rather clumsy
rationale was the difference between a given work and its means of
expression. The Court, critically, stated that " [t]he statute has not
provided for the protection of the intellectual conception apart from
the thing produced, however meritorious such conception may be. "78 It
instead "has provided for the making and filing of a tangible thing,
against the publication and duplication of which it is the purpose of
the statute to protect the composer. "79
The distinction between the "intellectual conception" and the
"tangible thing" therein described is difficult to defend or maintain. If
copyright is merely protection against the copying of a "tangible
thing," how could it protect adaptations to other languages,
conversions to other media, or performance rights, for which the law
has already provided? Yet the entire Court signed on to the opinion
- even Justice Holmes, whose subsequent body of copyright writings
would act against the principle stated in White-Smith. 80
For this reason we must look to other motivations and concerns.
One cannot help noticing that the effect of the decision was to place a
limit on the market power of the effective owner of the "intellectual
conception," namely, the incumbent industry. The decision also set an
institutional precedent (though one unevenly followed) of deciding
technologically sensitive copyright cases in favor of a challenger
industry in a manner likely to force Congress's hand. The denial of
protection in the context of a technologically innovative market
entrant will resurface in the history that follows. Seventy-six years
later, the Sony decision would cite White-Smith as the origin of this
"policy": "Sound policy, as well as history, supports our consistent
deference to Congress when maj or technological innovations alter the
market for copyrighted materials. "81 In practice, the decision to
"defer" to Congress activates copyright's communications regime, and

77. See, e.g. , Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright and Control over New Technologies of
Dissemination, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1613, 1622 (2001).
78. White-Smith, 209 U.S. at 17.
79. Id.
80. In Kalem Co. v. Harper Bros. , 222 U.S. 55, 61 (1911), Justice Holmes held the film
Ben-Hur to infringe a copyright on the novel, holding that "[t]he essence of the matter in the
case last supposed is not the mechanism employed but that we see the event or story lived."
See also Herbert v. Shanley Co., 242 U.S. 591 (1917) (discussed infra in text accompanying
notes 116-119).
81. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 431 (1984).
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the beginnings of a process of negotiated settlement between the
parties to the conflict.
* * *

Following White-Smith publishers and the mechanical machine
manufacturers moved quickly for a legislative settlement. Why
settlement?
First, the White-Smith litigation and the failure of earlier
congressional efforts provided important information. Despite all its
efforts, the publishing industry was unlikely to get either the courts or
Congress to provide a full-strength copyright that it might use in its
contest with the nascent recording industry. And by this time both
challengers and incumbents began to represent a serious threat to one
another. Following White-Smith, composers and publishers risked an
ongoing decay of their profitability because of their inability to extract
income from the recording industry. Conversely, the recording
industry still faced some possibility that publishers would succeed in
their efforts to extend copyright to mechanical recordings and use this
power against them.
Under these conditions the two parties settled on a statutory
"royalty" scheme that was the first compulsory license system. The
settlement was centered on a fixed, universal rate of two cents per
song, per copy. This settlement was primarily achieved during sessions
in 1908, and was codified as section 1( e) of the 1909 Copyright Act.82
The nature of the settlement was as follows: on the one hand,
Congress extended the copyright in compositions to mechanical
recordings. In exchange, the recording industry received statutorily
guaranteed access to all copyrighted compositions provided they pay a
standard fee. So long as the composer agreed or "knowingly
acquiesced" to an initial recording (an important condition), anyone
willing to pay the statutory fee would then be entitled to use any
copyrighted composition to record his own version of the song.
This mechanical license scheme survives to the present day.
Among academics it is occasionally praised for reducing transaction
costs, but more typically berated for its inflexibility and insensitivity to
changing economic conditions.83 Yet interestingly, neither party has
made a serious effort to repeal the mechanical license system.
Representatives of composers did not argue for its repeal in the 1976

82. See HARRY G. HENN, COPYRIGHT PRIMER 207 n.2 (1979).
83. See, e.g. , I. Trotter Hardy, Copyright and "New-Use" Technologies, 23 NOVA L.
REV. 659, 699-702 (1999) (criticizing compulsory licensing regimes as price-fixing); Robert P.
Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property Rights and Collective Rights
Organizations, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1293, 1300 (1996) (same).
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Copyright Act84 and today it is defended both by representatives of
composers and by the music industry.85 The only change has been the
effort to make the license fee adjustable.86
2.

The Wireless Age

"Radio is yet in its infancy," the doctor concluded, as he rose to go.
"But one thing is certain. In the lifetime of those who witnessed its
birth it will become a giant - but a benevolent giant who, instead of
destroying will re-create our civilization."87
Thus spoke Dr. Dale, sage of the 1922 book Radio Boys. 88 He had
reason to think radio was on the rise. Just one year earlier, a record
300,000 listened as boxer Jack Dempsey, the Manassa Mauler,
knocked out Georges Carpentier to defend the heavyweight title. For
perhaps the first time in history, more people experienced the event
distally than locally, most listening at "radio halls."89 According to the
Wireless Age: "The magic of the radio telephone had accomplished
new wonders. A daring idea had become a fact. "90
But the wonder of radio also gave birth to a festering, drawn-out
conflict: a decades-long war between the broadcast industry and an
alliance of sheet music publishers, composers and songwriters. The
conflict differs in an important respect from the piano roll and cable
broadcast disputes that came before and after it, respectively. There
was no incumbent broadcast industry interested in destroying or
stopping radio. Instead, existing authors wanted radio to succeed, but
they also wanted to milk radio for as much money as possible. Radio's
interest in paying as little as possible for its primary input created the
conflict described in what follows.
Commercial radio, like most new disseminator industries, began its
history accused of copyright piracy. Unlike modern radio with its "disc
jockeys," early 1920s broadcast usually meant setting up a microphone
84. 17 u.s.c. § 115 (2000).

85. See, e.g., Ken Anderson, Preserve the Compulsory License, BILLBOARD, June 11,
1994, at 6 (arguing that rescinding the compulsory license would create industry turmoil and
potential of monopolization).
86. The price is now set by a system of ad hoc Copyright Arbitration Royalty Panels. See
17 U.S.C. § 801 (2000) (creating the Copyright Arbitration Royalty Panels). For the year
2004, the mechanical license rate is 8.5 cents per song, or 1.65 cents per minute of playing
time, whichever is greater. See COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COPYRIGHT ROYALTY RATES, at
http://www.copyright.gov/carp/rn200a.html (last visited Sept. 10, 2004).
87. ALLEN CHAPMAN, THE RADIO BOYS TRAILING A VOICE 60 (1922).
88. Id.
89. See Voice-Broadcasting the Stirring Progress of the "Battle of the Century": How the
Largest A udience in History Heard the Description of the Dempsey-Carpentier Contest
Through the Use ofthe Radiophone, THE WIRELESS AGE, August, 1921, page 1 1-21, at 11.
90. Id at 1 1.
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for a performance, either within the studio or at a concert hall.91 Since
the music was already purchased or playing, ignoring copyright was
easy. But radio faced an organized adversary: the American Society of
Broadcasters, Composers and Publishers (ASCAP).
In 1913, the legend goes, composer Victor Herbert was dining in
New York's Shanley's Restaurant when the in-house orchestra struck
up one of his songs, "Sweethearts."92 He complained to the proprietor,
who presented him with a theory of copyright liability: since no
admission was being charged, the performance was not "for profit,"
and the restaurant not guilty of infringement. Herbert was determined
to prove him wrong and in 1914, with others, founded the ASCAP, a
collection of 170 authors and composers of music, along with 22
publishers of sheet music.93 The ASCAP's first target was the
restaurant and the performance that had attracted Herbert's ire. In
Herbert v. Shanley Co. , the ASCAP convinced the Supreme Court that
public performance in restaurants, despite no fee being charged, was
an unauthorized "public performance for profit."94
Justice Holmes wrote a simple three-paragraph opm10n,
concluding that since restaurants are not charities, when they play
music it must be in the interest of profit even if they do not charge at
the door. Restaurants, he observed, are not "eleemosynary. "95 They
provide music to provide their customers, "people having limited
powers of conversation . . . a luxurious pleasure not to be had from
eating a silent meal." In short, " [i]f music did not pay it would be given
up. If it pays it pays out of the public's pocket. Whether it pays or not
the purpose of employing it is profit and that is enough. "96
The opinion is simple economics, but underlying it is a substantive
view of the rights of the copyright holder. Holmes's opinion here and
in his other writings97 saw copyright as a commercial property to an
extent never reached before. His view, now mainstream, presumed the
copyright owner should have the power to demand a license for every
revenue stream dependent on the copyrighted work - even revenue
from adaptations to other media, or revenue arising from improved
91. See Stephen Davis, The Law of the Air, in THE RADIO INDUSTRY: THE STORY OF
ITS DEVELOPMENT 186-87 (1928).
92. See EDWARD SAMUELS, THE ILLUSTRATED STORY OF COPYRIGHT 41 (David
Stanford Burr ed., Thomas Dunne Books 2000); Leonard Allen, The Battle of Tin Pan A lley,
181 HARPER'S MAG. 514, 516 (1940).
93. See 2 MELVIN NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 8.19 (1988).
94. Herbert, 242 U.S. 591 (1917).
95. Id. at 594.
96. Id. at 595.
97. See, e.g., Kalem Co. v. Harper Bros., 222 U.S. 55, 63 (1911) (suggesting jobber could
be contributorily liable for unauthorized film version of book); Bleistein v. Donaldson
Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239 (1903) (holding commercial advertisement copyrightable).
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restaurant atmospherics. This, this Herbert principle, has had a
powerful impact on copyright's theory and evolution. It also put the
ASCAP in the business in which it remains today: offering "blanket"
licenses to restaurants, dance halls, and other places that perform
music.98 The blanket licenses, for a fixed percentage dependent on the
venue, allow the performance of all of the works written by ASCAP
members (members assign their performance rights to the ASCAP for
this purpose).99 It was these blanket licenses that the ASCAP offered
radio broadcasters, at first for free or for very low prices. But much of
the broadcast radio industry refused, and several decades of ferocious
animosity ensued.
Facing the demands of the ASCAP and feeling a sense of mutual
grievance, radio decided to get organized. On April 25, 1923, fifty-four
broadcasting men met at the Drake Hotel in Chicago.100 The product
of their meeting was the National Association of Broadcasters (NAB),
and its first priority was getting radio out of the copyright statute.101
Within a year, the NAB had a bill in the Senate that would have
exempted radio from copyright liability altogether.102 The bill, S. 2600,
proposed to amend section 1 of the 1909 Act, adding:
[C]opyright control shall not extend to public performances whether for
profit or without profit, of musical compositions where such performance
is made from printed or written sheets or by reproducing devices issued
under the authority of the owner of the copyright, or by use of the radio
or telephone, or both.103

But the bill died, and in retrospect the radio problem probably never
came closer to a legislative solution.
The broadcaster-composer conflict was open by the time of the
1925 Radio Convention, called by the Commerce Department, where
an early effort was made to settle the dispute. Notes from the meeting
show that the two sides agreed upon several points, including that
"there can be no continuation of broadcasting unless musical
compositions are made available to broadcasters upon a fair,

98. See Buffalo Broad. Co., Inc.
F. Supp. 274, 277 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).

v.

Am. Soc'y of Composers, Authors & Publishers, 546

99. See id. at 276.
100. See NAB: The First 75 Years, at http://www .nab.org/about/timeline.asp (last visited
Jan. 24, 2004).
101. See Angela J. Cambell, Self-Regulation and the Media, 51 FED. COMM. L.J. 711, 720
n.49 (1999).
102. To Amend the Copyright Act: Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the Comm. on
Patents on S. 2600, 68th Cong., 9-14 (1924) (statements of E.F. McDonald and Paul B.
Klugh).
103. S. 2600, 94th Cong. (1924).
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equitable, and permanent basis. "104 Nonetheless, "all attempted
solutions through negotiation . . . have proved unavailing."105 It was
resolved that Congress should settle things, but it never did.
The parties were probably unwilling to settle because each was in
the midst of pursuing its own legal strategy seeking total victory.
While the NAB unsuccessfully petitioned Congress, the ASCAP was
doing far better in the courts.106 Unlike White-Smith and later cases, no
radio cases reached the Supreme Court, mainly because the holdings
followed Herbert. So instead it was the Sixth Circuit whose word
became policy for radio.107
In 1924, the ASCAP brought a test case against radio station
WLW in Cincinnati for its unlicensed broadcast of a song named
"Dreamy Melody."108 The legal question was whether a radio
broadcast was in fact a "public performance for profit" under the
statute. The Sixth Circuit, following Holmes in Herbert v. Shanley Co. ,
answered the question "yes. "109 Said the court: "The artist is
consciously addressing a great, though unseen and widely scattered,
audience, and is therefore participating in a public performance."110
What of White-Smith's practice of leaving new technologies to
Congress? The broadcasters did in fact argue that the fate of radio was
better handled by the legislature, and Judge Mack duly noted that
" [b]ills have been introduced in both House and Senate to permit
broadcasting without infringing copyrights."111 While agreeing that the
final status was "eminently [a matter] for considered legislation," the
court nonetheless felt it had a duty to "decide whether and to what
extent statutes covering the subject-matter generally . . . are, fairly
construed, applicable to the new situation."112 The extension of the
Copyright Act's text to a new technology - the opposite approach to
that adopted in White-Smith and later Supreme Court cases - was a
turning point in the history of the radio conflict.
104. Proceedings of the Fourth National Radio Conference and Recommendations for
the Regulation of Radio, Nov. 9-1 1, 1925, at 37-38 (Government Printing Office 1926).
105. Id.
106. The litigation brought by composers was quite successful, particularly with respect
to the public performance right. See, e.g., Jerome H. Remick & Co. v. Am. Auto.
Accessories Co., 5 F.2d 411 (6th Cir. 1925) (enjoining defendant from radio broadcasting);
M. Witmark & Sons v. L. Bamberger & Co., 291 F. 776, 780 (D.N.J. 1923) (holding that
broadcasting in department store was "publicly for profit" within the meaning of the
Copyright Act); Harms v. Cohen, 279 F. 276 (E.D. Pa. 1922) (assessing liability against a
theater employing an organist playing copyrighted musical compositions).
107. See infra notes 130-134 and accompanying text.
108. Jerome H. Remick & Co., 5 F.2d 411 (6th Cir. 1925).
109. Id. at 412.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 411.
112. Id. at 411-12.
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The ASCAP's victory in the Sixth Circuit carried forward to other
courts and other decisions,113 as the Supreme Court denied certiorari.
The radio broadcasters had lost the first round, having no legislation
and no excuse. By 1931, they had little recourse but to begin paying
for ASCAP blanket licenses, and most began doing so.
It may be correct, as Jane Ginsburg argues, that the radio courts
did not sense any risk that the ASCAP wanted to destroy radio, and
that this may have affected both their decisions and the Supreme
Court's denials of certiorari.114 But if one goal of the radio cases was to
settle the relationship between radio and copyright once and for all,
they were a failure. The declaration of the rights of the copyright
holders was not a settlement of the conflict. The fight moved past
copyright to other legal strategies which served, as a 1941
commentator put it, to "deaden the effectiveness of the copyright
law."115 As we will see, after another three decades of continuous
conflict, antitrust law eventually imposed the settlement that the
copyright courts avoided.
In the mid-1930s, the NAB pushed the federal "Duffy Bill,"
targeting the remedies instead of the scope of copyright. Because
actual damages from copyright infringement could be minimal or
difficult to demonstrate, broadcasters noted that it was only the in
terrorum effect of statutory damages that compelled compliance. The
Duffy Bill would have repealed the statutory damage provisions of the
1909 Copyright Act.116 As a commentator in the 1940s stated, " [i]f the
minimum statutory damages were abolished, radio owners could
knowingly ignore the copyright laws . . . . "117 But with only the
broadcasters behind it, the Duffy Bill died.
As early as 1926, the NAB also began pressuring the Justice
Department to seek antitrust enforcement against the ASCAP, but to
no avail.118 In September 1933, the broadcasters filed their own private
antitrust suit,119 and in 1 934 the Justice Department, with the
broadcasters as cheering squad, changed its mind and filed its own

1 13. Pastime Amusement Co. v. M. Witmark & Sons, 2 F.2d 1020 (4th Cir. 1 924); M.
Witmark & Sons v. L. Bamberger & Co., 291 F. 776, 779-80 (D.N.J. 1923).
114. See Ginsburg, supra note 20, at 1619-21.
115. See Marcus Cohn, Music, Radio Broadcasters and the Sherman Act, 29 GEO. L.J.
407, 415 (1941).
116. S. 2465, 74th Cong. § 17 (1935) (limiting damages to the copyright owner's actual
damages and the infringer's profits).
117. Cohn, supra note 1 15, at 416.
1 18. In 1926, the Justice Department investigated ASCAP but found no reason to bring
an antitrust suit. See Cohn, supra note 1 15, at 424 n.91.
119. See Pennsylvania Broadcasting Co. v. Buck, (S.D.N.Y. , filed Sept. 7, 1933).
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antitrust petition against the ASCAP.120 But the government asked for
an adjournment after just two weeks of trial.121 The radio broadcasters'
legal strategy was again stalled.
Having no luck with the federal government, the radio
broadcasters turned to the states. The result was called "a series of
comprehensive and systematic attacks on the ASCAP, through the
medium of state legislatures."122 The methods of choice were "anti
monopoly" statutes that declared it illegal for owners of copyrighted
works to combine for purposes of fixing licensing fees.123 In other
words, the broadcasters sought and obtained state statutes making the
ASCAP illegal. Over several years, the broadcasters succeeded in
introducing such laws in thirty-five states and passing them in ten.124
Unfortunately for broadcasters, however, courts quickly found the
state laws preempted by the federal commerce power.125 The NAB's
efforts had failed again.
As an ASCAP commentator in 1939 put it, the broadcasters "had
resorted to every conceivable device and stratagem to destroy the
right of composers and authors to bargain collectively . . . . All to no
purpose."126 But the NAB was persistent. It compared its struggle
against the ASCAP to the fight against Hitler and redoubled its
efforts: "War is Hell, whether its purpose is to preserve democracy in
Europe against a madcap dictator or to preserve it in radio against an
arbitrary totalitarian ASCAP."127
The broadcasters' breakthrough came in 1941. That year, NAB ran
a successful year-long boycott of all ASCAP songs, relying instead on
songs in the public domain and those from the industry's own
performance rights organization, Broadcast Music, Inc. (BMI).128 This

120. See United States v. Am. Soc'y of Composers, Authors & Publishers, No. 78-388
(S.D.N.Y., filed August 30, 1934).
121. Why they stopped the case is not entirely clear. According to Lionel Sobel, it was in
part because the broadcasters and ASCAP agreed on a five-year compromise agreement
during the trial. See Lionel S. Sobel, The Music Business and the Sherman Act: An Analysis
of the "Economic Realities" of Blanket Licensing, 3 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 1, 5 (1983).
122. Cohn, supra note 1 15, at 416.
123. Two examples are 1937 Fla. Laws c. 17807, discussed in Gibbs v. Buck, 307 U.S. 66,
69 (1939), and 1937 Wash. Laws 218, discussed in Buck v. Gallagher, 307 U.S. 95, 97 (1939).
124. See Cohn, supra note 115, at 417 nn.60-63 (collecting state statutes).
125. See, e.g., Gibbs, 307 U.S. 66 (1939); Buck v. Harton, 33 F. Supp. 1014 (M.D. Tenn.
1940); Buck v. Swanson, 33 F. Supp. 377 (D. Neb. 1939); Notes and Legislation, Musical
Monopolies and Legislative Control, 53 HARV. L. REV. 458 (1940) (collecting cases).
126. E.C. Mills, Current Comment, The ASCAP-NAB Controversy: The ASCAP View,
11 AIR. L. REV. 394, 397 (1940).
127. Editorial, War, Hell and ASCAP, BROADCASTING, Oct. 1, 1939, at 48.
128. In 1940, the NAB organized an ASCAP boycott - members, for about a year, only
played songs from their own, competing performing rights society, Broadcast Music Inc.
("BMI"). See Cohn, supra note 115, at 420-421.
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time fate and history were on the broadcast industry's side. The
ASCAP didn't control every composer and every song: it required
composers to achieve a minimum of five hit songs before joining.129
This standard excluded less well known artists and also "hillbilly" and
"race" music (now known as "country" and "rhythm and blues,''
respectively).130 Switching to playlists comprising BMI and public
domain songs was therefore manageable, if not ideal.131
The Justice Department, meanwhile, was convinced to bring yet
another antitrust action. This time, the ASCAP decided to negotiate a
settlement, resulting in the 1941 consent decree.132 This, in turn, was
renegotiated in 1950,133 after the movie industry joined in and filed a
successful antitrust action against the ASCAP.134
The details of the antitrust litigation against the ASCAP have been
told many times.135 What is relevant here is that the results of the
antitrust litigation and settlement were quite similar to those of
copyright settlements achieved elsewhere.
The 1950 decree limited the scope of copyright in compositions
rather like a statutory or compulsory license. Section VI of the decree
ordered the ASCAP to grant blanket licenses to its copyrights, and
section IV required the ASCAP to grant such licenses non-exclusively
and without discrimination. 136 These are, of course, the basic features
of a compulsory license: it guarantees that the work will be available,
and it remains available regardless of how many other parties have
already received a compulsory license.

129. See PAUL KINGSBURY, BMI 50TH ANNIVERSARY HISTORY BOOK 2 (1990) ("At
one time, many types of music had limited access to the mainstream of the American music
business, and to the American audience at large.").
130. See id.
131. Herman Finkelstein, an ASCAP attorney, stated in 1954 that during the boycott
"the value of radio sets was substantially lessened for those who enjoyed the best in popular
music." Herman Finkelstein, The Composer and the Public Interest - Regulation of
Performing Right Societies, 19 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 275, 287 (1954). Conversely, some
radio stations reported that their public praised them for the new type of music they
broadcasted during the boycott. See WFBL Optimistic on BM/, VARIETY, Dec. 25, 1940, at
24.
132. United States v. Am. Soc'y of Composers, Authors & Publishers, 1940-1943 Trade
Cas. (CCH) 'lI 56,104 (S.D.N.Y. 1941).
133. See United States v. Am. Soc'y of Composers, Authors & Publishers, 1950 Trade
Cas. (CCH) 'lI 62,595, at 63,751 (S.D.N.Y. 1 950).
134. See Alden-Rochelle, Inc. v. Am. Soc'y of Composers, Authors & Publishers, 80 F.
Supp. 888 (S.D.N.Y. 1948).
135. See, e.g. , Richard W. Ergo, Comment, ASCAP and the Antitrust Laws: The Story of
a Reasonable Compromise, 1959 DUKE L.J. 258 (1959); Susan Stager, Musical Performing
Rights in the Television Industry: Has the Blanket License Finally Seen Its Demise?, 14 Sw. U.
L. REV. 569, 572-73 (1984).
136. See United States v. Am. Soc'y of Composers, Authors & Publishers, 1950 Trade
Cas. (CCH) at 63,753.
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The 1950 consent decree, like a statutory license, also had
something to say about pricing. Unlike the mechanical license, which
set a statutory price (two cents per song per recording), the 1950
consent decree gave an Article III court the final say in music pricing.
Section IX of the 1950 consent decree required the ASCAP to notify
users of its fees, which were to be reasonable. In the event that the
ASCAP and its users could not agree on a price within sixty days,
appeal was available to the district court, which would set a
"reasonable price. "137
Under these terms, the legal regulation of broadcast music
effectively became a form of liability, as opposed to property,
regime.138 Broadcasters were not liable for infringement as long as
they paid a price set by the government. The story of the birth of
radio, in short, has more in common with other copyright conflicts
than meets the eye. The initial decision of the copyright courts to
extend full copyright in radio broadcasts did not prevent the
emergence of a compulsory licensing scheme.
3.

Cable Television

&

the Broadcasting Industry

The third major example of what I have described as copyright's
settlement function arises out of the bitter mid-century conflict
between broadcasters and the upstart cable industry. Reduced to its
essentials, beginning in the late 1950s the broadcast industry and its
affiliates mounted a large, successful effort to contain the growth of
cable using every regulatory and political device at their disposal, 139
while the cable industry capitalized on its unregulated status to erode
the dominant position of broadcast.140
A general (albeit uneasy) settlement to the conflict was achieved
by the late 1970s through a compromise on copyright legislation and
the rescission of the most onerous of the FCC's regulations and

137. See id at 63,754. Rate-setting requests have been brought to the Court, but have
always been settled before the merits are reached. See W. Michael Gamer, United States v.
ASCAP: The Licensing Provisions of the A mended Final Judgment of 1950, 23 BULL.
COPYRIGHT SOC'Y 119, 127-28 (1976).
138. For the seminal discussion of property versus liability rules, see Guido Calabresi &
A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the
Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972).
139. For a very brief history of the relationship among cable, the FCC, and Congress,
see Ashutosh Bhagwat, Of Markets and Media: The First Amendment, the New Mass Media,
and the Political Components of Culture, 74 N.C. L. REV. 141, 150-55 (1995).
140. See Thomas W. Hazlett, The Wireless Craze, the Unlimited Bandwidth Myth, the
Spectrum Auction Faux Pas, and the Punchline to Ronald Coase's "Big Joke": an Essay on
Airwave Allocation Policy, 14 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 335, 416-17 (2001).
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pseudo-copyrights.141 With this settlement, cable began a smoother
accession to its present domination of television dissemination.142
a. The challenge. Cable was not, at first, a challenger to the
broadcast industry. The first cable systems, then known as
"community antenna" television (CATV), developed in rural areas in
the late 1940s. The goal of the early deployments was modest: solving
the problem of bringing broadcast television to remote or
mountainous areas otherwise left in the dark.143 In the late 1940s, early
cable operators in places like Astoria, Oregon (the site of the first
recognized CATV deployment) erected large, community antennas to
bring distant signals to small towns.144 The broadcast signal captured
by the community antenna was retransmitted to people's homes using
physical cables.145
In this early manifestation, cable simply complemented broadcast
service.146 By allowing the broadcast signal to reach areas not served
by broadcast, it expanded the television audience to the advantage of
broadcast stations. This changed, however, by the late 1950s, when
broadcasters realized cable's threat as a successor industry.
Broadcasters had reason to fear. Cable technology had two clear
advantages over broadcast technology that are now obvious:
programming diversity147 (more channels) and signal quality. In the
face of this competitive threat, the broadcast industry adopted the
familiar arguments of piracy,148 unfair competition,149 and economic

141. See , e.g., Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 415 U.S. 394, 414
(1974) (refusing to apply copyright law in the cable retransmission context); Fortnightly
Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390, 399-402 (1968) (holding that cable TV
is a "viewer" and therefore does not "perform" within the meaning of the controlling
copyright law). Congress "settled" this dispute by promulgating a cable compulsory licensing
scheme. See 17 U.S.C. § 111 (2000).
142 See Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, 47 U.S.C.
§ 521(a)(2)-(5) (2000) (detailing the increase in cable viewership and noting that "the cable
television industry has become a dominant nationwide video medium").
143. See Kent D. Wakeford, Note, Municipal Cable Franchising: An Unwarranted
Intrusion into Competitive Markets, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 233, 237 n.16 and accompanying text
(1995).
144. See id. n.15.
145. See id.
146. See Patrick Murphy, Note, Retransmission Consent: A Mixed Signal for Cable
Copyright, 17 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 237, 240 (1993) (describing this model).
147. In the 1960s, diversity meant the importing of signals from other areas using
microwave transmission technology. See Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc.,
415 U.S. 394, 400 n.4 (1974) (describing microwave transmission technology). For example,
to create an attractive service, a cable operator in Philadelphia might import independent
stations from New York City in order to offer a broader selection of content than available
from broadcast alone.
148. This was the rhetoric surrounding, for example, the compulsory-license provisions
allowing cable to rebroadcast captured signals. See Mary C. Dollarhide, Note, Surrogate Rule
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disruption favored by incumbent industries. In other words, it adopted
the arguments of the sheet music manufacturers in the piano-roll era
and of the record companies today.150 Along with these claims of unfair
competition, the broadcast industry added appeals to "localism," the
national policy of subsidizing the existence of local broadcasting
stations in every community.
The unfair competition or piracy claim was simply that cable
operators, because they did not pay for the content they retransmitted,
were stealing content and competing unfairly. Rhetorically, the
broadcast industry openly and repeatedly accused cable operators of
"signal piracy." As the copyright office summarized their argument in
1965: " [Cable operators] neither need nor deserve a free ride at the
expense of copyright owners . . . . The activities of the CATV
operators constitute a 'clear moral wrong' comparable to the old
practice of 'bicycling' movies from one theater to another in order to
get two performances out of one license."151
As a local broadcaster testified in 1958: "We believe that when a
community antenna system takes our programs out of the air, without
our permission, and sells that program material at a profit - and in
many cases, a fantastic profit, indeed - this is a violation of our
property rights. "152
Jack Valenti of the Motion Picture Association made similar
arguments on the eve of settlement, June 1975, in testimony before
Congress:
If the Congress exempts television - cable television - from
copyright . . . [it] will not only be magnifying and sanctifying a terrible
injustice, but it will have created a huge parasite in the marketplace,
feeding and fattening itself off of local television stations and copyright
owners of copyrighted material. We do not like it because we think it
wrong and unfair.153
Making: Problems and Possibilities Under the Administrative Procedure Act, 61 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1017, 1027 (1988).
149. The Supreme Court accepted the unfair competition rationale in Turner
Broadcasting System, Inc. v. F. C. C. , 512 U.S. 622, 652 (1994) ("In short, the must-carry
provisions are not designed to favor or disadvantage speech of any particular content.
Rather, they are meant to protect broadcast television from what Congress determined to be
unfair competition by cable systems." (emphasis added)).
150. See supra, text accompanying notes 60-71.
151. HOUSE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, 89TH CONG., COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION
PART 6 SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL
REVISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW: 1965 REVISION BILL 42 (Co mm . Print 1965).
152. Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, United
States Senate, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1959) (statement of William C. Grove).
153. See U.S. Cong. House Comm. on the Judiciary Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties
and the Administration of Justice Hearings, 92d Cong. (1972) (statement of Jack Valenti),
reprinted in 15 OMNIBUS COPYRIGHT REVISION LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 727 (George S.
Grossman ed., 1976).
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Broadcasters associated themselves with the creation of
programming content and linked cable to the destruction of incentives
for creation. The incumbents argued that the creation of programming
rested on a delicate balance of incentives: broadcasters paid for the
creation of the programming content and received local advertising
revenue in return, serving the public interest by creating new works.
Cable operators, on the other hand, did not create new works and
therefore competed unfairly.
But if cable simply carried broadcast signals, how did it endanger
broadcasting or the creation of new works? The broadcasters'
arguments relied on the concept of audience fragmentation.154 They
argued that the cable operators' practice of importing signals from
"foreign" markets (i.e., from Memphis to St. Louis) would fragment
the viewing audiences between local stations and the foreign
imports. 155 Imports would destroy advertising revenue because St.
Louis advertisers, faced with an audience fragmented between stations
of both cities, would pay less. Meanwhile, since local advertisers in
Memphis had no interest in reaching buyers in St. Louis audiences, the
result was a net loss in the amount broadcasters could charge for
advertising.156 Broadcasters charged that the fragmentation problem
would destroy the economic viability of free television.
The broadcast industry advanced concerns for "localism" in
addition to those regarding audience fragmentation.157 The FCC in
1952 declared localism a goal of national broadcasting policy:
broadcast should "provide each community with at least one television
broadcast station."158 The idea was that the public interest was served
not only by the programming of the "big three" networks, but also by
local broadcast stations that could provide content on matters of local
importance.159 Cable operators, by importing signals, were a
particularly serious threat to the viability of local broadcasters in small
markets.
Finally, even if cable did offer desirable diversity in programming,
broadcasters argued that the goal of diversity was better achieved
through more broadcast stations in every community, not the import

154. See, e.g. , United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 160 n.4 (detailing
concerns regarding fragmentation in the San Diego market).
155. See id.
156. See id.
157. Localism as a concept is discussed in Glen 0. Robinson, The Electronic First
Amendment: An Essay for the New Age, 47 DUKE L.J. 899, 904 (1998).
158. See Report and Order, 17 Fed. Reg. 3912 (1952).
159. See id.
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and export of signals around the country.160 In particular, broadcasters
promoted developing new ultra-high frequency (UHF) stations as the
preferred means for achieving programming diversity.161
In retrospect, the weakness of these arguments is apparent. Cable
was indeed a threat to broadcasting because it was a better means of
disseminating television. Yet it did not follow that cable was also a
threat to programming, because it could (and did) ultimately develop
an interest in the availability of new works. In particular, cable, as
most now recognize, was the savior of UHF broadcasting because it
improved the weak signal strength of UHF stations.162 In retrospect,
the key would be to make cable a stakeholder - part of the
compensation system for newly created works - without giving
broadcast a tool to destroy its rival. This, ultimately, was the role that
the copyright liability scheme would play.
b. Controlling the challenger. Faced with the competitive threat of
cable, in the 1960s the broadcast industry and its allies163 exploited all
available regulatory means to control the growth of cable. The
industry pursued three separate legal strategies: common-law
misappropriation arguments, copyright infringement litigation, and a
kind of "pseudo-copyright" through FCC regulation.
The TV broadcast industry turned first to the common law in an
effort to gain property rights in its broadcast signals. Beginning in the
late 1950s, the broadcasters asked the courts to find the behavior of
cable companies a violation of common-law misappropriation under
International News Service v. Associated Press and other common-law
theories.164 The argument in these lawsuits was simple: cable operators
are stealing our product (the signal) without providing compensation,
are therefore competing unfairly, and should be stopped. In
International News Service, this basic theory had persuaded the
Supreme Court to prevent one wire service from stealing news from

160. These arguments were reflected in the 1958 "Cox Report" on cable television. See
Kenneth Cox, The Problem of Television Service for Smaller Communities. Staff Report to
the Senate Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 26 Dec. 1958.
161. See id.
162. See Joel Rosenbloom, The "Vast Wasteland" in Retrospect, 55 FED. COMM. L.J. 571,
575 (2003) (citing BRUCE M. OWEN & STEVEN s. WILDMAN, VIDEO ECONOMICS 214-15
(1992)).
163. An example of an ally is the manufacturers of television antennas, organized as the
Television Accessory Manufacturers' Institute ("TAME"), who obviously had much to lose
from competition with cable. See DON R. LE Due, CABLE TELEVISION AND THE FCC 142143 (1972).
164. 248 U.S. 215 (1918). Int'/ News Serv. held that news wires have a quasi-property
right in hot news. See id. at 245-46. The broadcasters also argued for tortious interference
with contract, see Associated Press v. Int'I News Serv., 240 F. 983, 995 (S.D.N.Y. 1917), but
the misappropriation theory received the most attention in the court of appeals. See
Associated Press v. Int'I News Serv., 245 F. 244, 252 (2d Cir. 1917).
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another, creating a pseudo-property interest in hot news. 165 Such a
right would have served broadcasting's interests perfectly.
But these efforts failed. In closely watched litigation, the Ninth
Circuit held that the broadcasters' remedy, if any, must lie in
copyright.166 Pointing out that the broadcasters sought "what are in
essence copyright interests," the court found the state grounds for
protecting broadcasters' rights federally preempted.167 The case was
decided on the authority of two recently decided intellectual property
preemption cases: Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co. 1 68 and Compco
Corporation v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. 169 The court recognized that
the common law right threatened the "primary right of public access
to all in the public domain . . . . "170 It reasoned that the creation of "a
new protectible interest . . . [would] 'interfere with the federal
policy . . . of allowing free access to copy whatever the federal patent
and copyright laws leave in the public domain. "' 1 71
On the other hand, the FCC was seemingly immune to such
concerns. With the FCC's regulation of cable began a tradition of
using the FCC to achieve regulatory outcomes that had been rejected
by Congress or the copyright courts (and vice versa). Bit by bit, urged
on by broadcasters, the FCC created a regime of pseudo-property
rights and other rules. For a time, this gave the broadcast industry the
means to control the development of the cable industry. 1 72
While initially hesitant,173 the FCC began asserting jurisdiction in
1962.174 By 1966, in its Second Report and Order,175 the FCC had come

165. See Int'/ News Serv. , 248 U.S. at 245-46.
166. Cable Vision, Inc. v. KUTY Inc., 335 F.2d 348, 350 (9th Cir. 1964).
167. Id.
168. 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
169. 376 U.S. 234 (1964).
170. 335 F.2d at 350.
171. Id. at 351 (quoting Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. , 376 U.S. 234, 237
(1964)).
172. See infra notes 222-247. See also Stanley M. Besen & Robert W. Crandall, The
Deregulation of Cable Television, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1981, at 77, 81-91
(documenting FCC activity constraining the growth of cable).
173. See Frontier Broad. Co., 24 F.C.C. 251 (1958) (declining to exercise jurisdiction
over cable on the ground that it was not a common carrier), reconsideration denied, 26
F.C.C. 403, 428 (1959).
174. The FCC assumed jurisdiction over microwave service transmitting distant TV
signals to cable television in 1962, requiring cable systems to carry local broadcast signals as
a condition of a microwave license to rural cable systems. See Carter Mtn. Transmission, 32
F.C.C. 459 (1962), affd, 321 F.2d 359 (D.C. Cir.) (1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 951 (1963).
175. See Amendment of Subpart L, Part 91, to Adopt Rules & Regulations to Govern
the Grant of Authorizations in the Bus. Radio Serv. for Microwave Stations to Relay
Television Signals to Cmty. Antenna Sys., Second Report and Order, 2 F.C.C.2d 725 (1966)
[hereinafter Second Report and Order].
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to agree with the broadcasters' substantive arguments and to associate
harm with cable's existence.176 By 1966, broadcasters had persuaded
the FCC to enact a full regime of cable regulation that effectively
conferred property rights upon broadcasters' asserted interests. The
FCC rules barred duplication of local broadcasting (non-duplication
rules),177 forced cable systems to carry local signals (must-carry
rules),178 and barred cable operators from importing signals into any of
the top 100 television markets unless the cable operator could obtain a
waiver by obtaining the consent of local broadcast stations.179 These
"unbelievable"180 rules, articulated by the FCC as a defense of
localism, provided the broadcast industry with effective governmental
protection from its nascent cable rival. They were the high-water mark
of late 1960s FCC interventionism, aptly characterized as the
Commission's own Vietnam.
In retrospect, the experiment with the waiver regime was
something of a dry run for a full copyright regime. The results were
not promising. A 1976 study found that during the period from 1968 to
1972, broadcasters agreed to a waiver allowing import in only one
instance.181 While it may be that the regime was not given enough time
to work, the more likely explanation is that the broadcast industry
tried to starve its rival.182 It hints at some of the dangers of copyright as
between rival disseminators, particular in early stages.
Broadcasters' third line of attack was a copyright litigation
campaign. In 1968, the inevitable question of cable's copyright liability
reached the Supreme Court in Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists
Television, Inc.183 The case was factually simple. A West Virginia cable
operator had retransmitted various broadcasted programs to its
customers. The broadcast industry, through copyright owners, argued
that the cable industry's retransmission amounted to an unauthorized
public performance under the Copyright Act.184

176. See id. at 774-78 (attempting to limit growth of cable).
177. See id. at 746.
178. See id.
179. See id. at 782.
180. Fred H. Cate, The Future of Communications Policy Making, 3 WM. & MARY BILL
RTS. J. 1, 3 (1994).
181. See Michael Botein, The New Copyright Act and Cable Television - A Signal of
Change, 24 BULL. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y U.S.A. 1 , 4 (1976) ("[C]able operators somehow never
were able to get consent.").
182. Niels B. Schaumann, Note, Copyright Protection in the Cable Television Industry:
Satellite Retransmission and the Passive Carrier Exemption, 51 FORDHAM L. REV. 637, 648
n.105 (1982) (speculating as to the reasons for the failure).
183. 392 U.S. 390 (1968).
184. See id. at 395.
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But the Court disagreed, ruling that cable television was the
functional equivalent of a more powerful antenna and that it was no
more of a performer than an antenna manufacturer would be.185 As in
White-Smith, not all of the Court's reasoning was apparent in the
decision. The court held that the cable operators were part of the
audience for broadcast, and hence were not "performing" the work.186
Yet it was clear that the cable operators were making money using
copyrighted content - what had happened to the Herbert principle?
What about Justice Holmes' point that "the purpose of employing it is
profit, and that is enough"? Moreover, in 1931 the Court had decided
a factually similar radio case in the opposite manner, holding that a
hotel that rebroadcast radio stations into private rooms without
permission was infringing copyright.187 Something else was clearly
afoot. Did the Court actually believe that its decision served the
interests of copyright holders? Was the Court deferring to the FCC, or
practicing its own communications policy?
We can only get our clues from the dissent.188 Justice Fortas
presented the policy considerations squarely, and in the language of
communications policy, not copyright law: "it is darkly predicted that
the imposition of full liability upon all CATV operations could result
in the demise of this new, important instrument of mass
communications . . . . "189 "0n the other hand," Justice Fortas noted, "it
is foreseen that a decision to the effect that CATV systems never
infringe the copyrights of the programs they carry would permit such
systems to overpower local broadcasting stations . . . . "190 The case, as
he saw it, was almost pure communications policy, pitting the interests
of a new telecommunications medium against a national policy of
localism. Fortas believed the Court should act to "do as little damage
as possible to traditional copyright principles and to business
relationships," but also favored a legislative solution to "relieve[] the
embarrassment which [the Court] and the interested parties face."191
The seeds of a future copyright settlement are evident from the
Fortnightly litigation. Solicitor General Erwin Griswold suggested in
his amicus brief on the merits that the Supreme Court could

185. See id. at 399.
186. See id. 400-01.
187. See Buck v. Jewell LaSalle Realty Co., 283 U.S. 191, 198-99 (1931) (holding that
playing copyrighted musical compositions broadcast from radio station via hotel
loudspeakers is infringing performance).
188. 392 U.S. at 402-8 (Fortas, J., dissenting).
189. Id. at 403 (Fortas, J., dissenting). Justice Fortas would have found cable operators
liable under the authority of Buck v. Jewell-LaSalle Realty Corp., 283 U.S. 191 (1931).
190. Id. at 403.
191. Id. at 404.
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reasonably impose a copyright settlement in its decision.192 He asked
the Court to find cable broadcasters liable, but to imply a license in
areas where broadcast signals were weak. The Solicitor General was,
in effect, inviting the Supreme Court to write communications
regulation into its interpretation of the copyright statute. While both
majority and dissent declined the invitation to settle the dispute in this
manner, it foreshadowed a copyright settlement.
Where the Court would not go, the FCC would. In the aftermath
of Fortnightly, the FCC proposed granting broadcasters rights even
more similar to copyright than the existing regime did, as if to
compensate for their loss. In 1 968 the FCC proposed the introduction
of importation consent.193 As the name suggests, this rule would
require cable operators to obtain the consent of the originating
broadcaster before importing any program into a top 100 market.194
But Congress was more interested in a copyright solution, and the
proposal was never enacted.195
c. Settlement & copyright. In 1 970, it appeared that the predicted
rise of cable technology was slowed, if not frozen. A law review article
appearing that year declared that " [a]lthough cable television offers
the potential of greatly increased television diversity, its possibilities
have been left largely unrealized."196 While cable had grown to reach
about 6% of households, with approximately 4.5 million subscribers,197
its challenge to broadcast was halted at the urban border. As
economists Stanley Besen and Robert Crandall explained matters,
" [c)able entered the 1 970s as a small business relegated principally to
rural areas and small communities and held hostage by television
broadcasters to the [FCC's) hope for the development of UHF."198
By the end of the decade, however, cable had been released from
its figurative prison. Through a decade-long process of compromise,
negotiation, FCC rulemaking and congressional legislation, a truce of
sorts was reached. Most of the FCC's pseudo-property rights idea and
other restrictions were abandoned199 and what emerged was a system

192. See id. at 401 n.32.
193. See Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and Notice of Inquiry, 15 F.C.C.2d 417, 432
(1968).
194. See id. at 459.
195. In re Commission Proposals for Regulation of Cable Television, 31 F.C.C.2d 1 15,
115-17 (1971) (letter from the FCC to Senate Communications Subcommittee).
196. Leonard Chazen & Leonard Ross, Federal Regulation of Cable Television: The
Visible Hand, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1820, 1820 (1970).
197. Television Digest, 51 TELEVISION & CABLE FACTBOOK 1, 1560 (1983).
198. Besen & Crandall, supra note 172, at 93.
199. That they were abandoned did not prevent their subsequent reintroduction. The
Federal Communications Commission in the 1980s and Congress in 1992 reintroduced
various forms of protection for the broadcast industry. See, e.g., Cable Television Consumer
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centered on a copyright liability regime.200 While by no means an
aesthetic exercise, that period's history illustrates the role the
copyright regime played in one of the most bitter technological
succession wars of the century.
By 1970, broadcasters had successfully convinced the FCC to
impose serious limits on the growth of cable.201 So why would
broadcasters even want to turn to a copyright compromise, given that
it might jeopardize a favorable status quo?
Primarily, a copyright solution appeared more durable. The
restrictive regime created by the FCC was in a state of constant flux
and was easier to change than copyright legislation. New
commissioners at the FCC could (and ultimately did) agree with the
positions of cable television, jeopardizing broadcasters' favorable
position. In particular, mounting evidence suggested that the danger of
cable systems to television (as opposed to broadcasters) was
exaggerated.202 This suggests that broadcasters may have felt pressure
to convert their temporary regulatory advantage into a more lasting
source of revenue.
For broadcasters, this problem was compounded by the growing
power of the cable industry. Despite the limitations on growth in
urban areas, cable continued to grow in rural and small markets,
trebling in size between 1966 and 1970.203 The growing power of the
cable industry suggested that broadcasters' ability to influence the
regulatory and legislative process might erode over time, making a
more durable compromise attractive.
Finally, in the late 1960s, many broadcasters began investing in
cable systems. By 1966, broadcasters had some stake in 30 percent of
cable companies.204 With interests on both sides, broadcasters wanted
a solution that would allow cable to grow in exchange for payoffs to
the broadcasting industry, a purpose better served by a copyright
royalty system than FCC regulations.
Yet none of this meant that broadcasters were interested in an
immediate copyright settlement. They still had a chance of achieving

Protection and Competition Act of 1992, 47 U.S.C.A. § 521 (2004) (enacting retransmission
consent); Amendment of Parts 73 and 76 of the Commission's Rules Relating to Program
Exclusivity in the Cable and Broadcast Industries, 3 F.C.C.R. 5299, 5300 (1988) (report and
order) (syndication rules)
200. This regime was the compulsory licensing system of § 111 of the 1976 Copyright
Act. 17 U.S.C. § 111 (2000).
201. Primarily through the provisions in the Second Report and Order, supra note 175.
202. See Besen & Crandall, supra note 172, at 97.
203. Viewership rose from about 1.5 million viewers to 4.5 million. See Television
Digest, supra note 197.
204. See PATRICK R. PARSONS & ROBERT M. FRIEDEN, THE CABLE AND SATELLITE
TELEVISION INDUSTRIES 47 (1998).
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total victory: namely, a Supreme Court decision finding cable
retransmission illegal without permission. It was not until the Supreme
Court played its final hand in 1 974205 that settlement became
imminent.
An early blueprint of the cable-broadcast settlement was the
"Compromise Agreement of 1971,"206 representing an agreement
between major cable, broadcasting, and programming interests. The
basic outlines of the compromise were as follows: cable, for the first
time, would agree to some system of copyright liability, in exchange
for a general loosening of FCC restrictions on entry into urban
markets and other concessions to public service.207 While the
consensus did not last, in the end the agreement was the starting point
for a near-total deregulation of cable systems in exchange for
copyright liability.
The compromise, brokered in part by new FCC chairman Dean
Baruch, began to be implemented on the regulatory side with new
FCC rules that allowed cable systems limited importation rights in the
top 100 markets.208 The 1972 rules, described as "among the most
complex rules and regulations ever devised by the mind of man,"
began a gradual process of FCC deregulation of the cable industry.209
The copyright side of the deal took four more years to settle
through the legislative process. While the major industry associations
remained committed to the agreement, many members of the cable
industry sought to defect. For example, representatives of
Teleprompter Corp., one of the nation's largest cable systems,
appeared before Congress to demand continued immunity from
copyright, claiming that the consensus agreement was "pushed down

205. See infra text accompanying note 234.
206. The consensus agreement is described in U.S. Cong. House Comm. on the Judiciary
Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties and the Administration of Justice Hearings, 92d Cong.
(1972), in 14 OMNIBUS COPYRIGHT REVISION LEGIS. HIST. 502 (George s. Grossman ed.,
1976) (statement of Rex A. Bradley).
207. See Cable Television Report and Order, 36 F.C.C.2d 143 (1972). As described by
the chairman of the National Cable and Telecommunications Association, "in 1971, in an
effort to break the regulatory impasse over cable, the Office of Telecommunications Policy
and the FCC fashioned the so called 'Consensus Agreement' under which the parties broadcasters, copyright owners, and cable - affirmed support for copyright legislation and
approved the outline for new FCC cable regulations." U.S. Cong. House Comm. on the
Judiciary Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties and the Admin. of Justice Hearings (Part 1) ,
supra note 204, at 502 ..
208. See Cable Television Report and Order, 36 F.C.C.2d at 241. The new rules allowed
cable systems to import sufficient signals to offer 3 network plus 3 independent signals in
markets 1-50, 3 network plus 2 independents in markets 51-100, and 3 networks plus 1
independent outside the top 100 markets. See id. The rules also required a minimum 20
channel capacity. See Cable Television Report and Order, 36 F.C.C.2d at paras. 57-77.
209. See generally Besen & Crandall, supra note 172, at 93-103.
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the throat of the cable television industry."210 Teleprompter and other
cable operators returned to the position that cable systems were
nothing but another form of antenna: " [W]hy should there be any
liability when the viewer avails himself of the antenna tower erected
by the cable television station?"�11
On the other side, broadcasters made a final effort to obtain full
copyright liability with the Teleprompter litigation. 212 Teleprompter,
unlike Fortnightly, was a signal importation case. Columbia
Broadcasting Systems could point to Teleprompter's imports, some
from distances as far as 450 miles,213 and make the audience
fragmentation argument described above. Yet the Supreme Court
proved uninterested in undoing the line drawn in the Fortnightly
decision. "'Broadcasters perform. Viewers [including cable] do not
perform.'"214 With that, broadcasters exhausted their last chance at
obtaining full victory - total copyright liability.
Congress enacted the copyright side of the compromise in 1976.
The form was a compulsory licensing law, codified in section 111 of
the 1976 Act.215 As a settlement, on the one hand it allowed the cable
systems to continue their basic means of doing business:
retransmission of broadcast programs. Yet in exchange, cable systems
agreed to pay royalties on imported signals,216 not to alter the content
or advertising of the signals it retransmitted,217 and to retransmit
programs simultaneously with the broadcast.218 In short, the licensing
scheme mapped the existing business practices of cable companies,
and added transfer payments to it. The extent of these payments was
to be determined by a new statutory creation, the Copyright Royalty
Tribunal.219
210. U.S. Cong. House Comm. on the Judiciary Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties and
the Administration of Justice Hearings (Part 1), 94th Cong. (1975), in 14 OMNIBUS
COPYRIGHT REVISION LEGIS. HIST. 671 (George s. Grossman ed., 1977) (statement of
William J. Bresnan).
211. U.S. Cong. House Comm. on the Judiciary Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties and
the Administration ofJustice Hearings (Part I), supra note 210, at 667 (statement of William
J. Bresnan).
212. Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 415 U.S. 394 (1974).
213. Id. at 400.
214. Id. at 403 (quoting Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, 392 U.S. 390, 398
(1968)).
215. 17 U.S.C. § l ll(c)(l) (2000).
216. Id.
217. 17 U.S.C. § l l l(c)(3).
218. 17 U.S.C. § l l l (c)(l), (f) (2000).
219. 17 U.S.C. §§ 801-810 (1976). The Tribunal was abolished in 1993 and its functions
transferred to the Copyright Office and the Librarian of Congress. See Copyright Royalty
Tribunal Reform Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-198, 107 Stat. 2304 (1993) (codified at 17
U.S.C. §§ 801-03 (2000)).
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In the last stage of the 1970s settlement, the FCC repealed most of
the remaining regulation of the cable industry. By January 1, 1 978, as
the copyright system came into force, the core remaining limitations of
the old regime were the "distant-signal" limitations, which limited the
import of programming into large (top 100) television markets,220 and
the syndicated exclusivity rules, which allowed local stations in urban
areas to force cable to black out programs for which they had
purchased exclusive exhibition rights.221 Together, these two rules
continued to limit cable's exploitation of urban markets. But in 1980,
the FCC repealed these last regulations.222 It concluded that the
absence of evidence of economic harm and the new copyright scheme
had eliminated any need for its copyright "surrogates."223 With this
decision, the replacement of prohibitive FCC regulations with
copyright liability was essentially complete.224
Freed from regulatory limits, cable subscription exploded,
quadrupling from 1975 to 1985. The 3,506 systems serving nearly ten
million subscribers became, by 1985, 6,600 systems serving nearly forty
million Americans.225 It had taken thirty years and much regulatory
warfare, but cable completed its succession of broadcast and assumed
its place as the dominant technology of television.
d. Epilogue. As telecommunications historians know, the 1970s did
not entirely end the regulatory battles between cable and
broadcasting. The Copyright Royalty Tribunal, for example, attracted
enormous litigation in its setting of fees.226 There emerged in the 1980s
a movement (backed by broadcasters) to tame the power of cable,
culminating in Congress reinstating some of the regulations that the
FCC had dropped in the late 1970s. For example, in 1992 Congress
adopted the retransmission consent rule first proposed by the FCC in

220. FCC Cable Television Service, 47 C.F.R. §§ 76.59(b)-(e), 76.6l(b)-(f), 76.63 (1980).
221. 47 C.F.R. §§ 76.151-61.
222 See Cable Television Syndicated Program Exclusivity Rules, 79 F.C.C.2d 663
(1980), affd sub nom, Malrite T.V. of N.Y. v. FCC, 652 F.2d 1140 (2d Cir. 1981).
223. Inquiry into the Economic Relationship between Television Broadcasting & Cable
Television, 71 F.C.C.2d 632 (1979).
224. Only the network non-duplication and must-carry rules remained in place. See
Cable Television Syndicated Program Exclusivity Rules, 79 F.C.C.2d 663 (1980), affd sub
nom, Malrite T.V. of N.Y. v. FCC, 652 F.2d 1140 (2d Cir. 1981).
225. See PARSONS & FRIEDEN, supra note 204, at 57-60 (detailing the cable "explosion"
of the 1980s); see also Sharon Strover, United States: Cable Television, at http://www.
museum.tv/archives/etv/U/htrn!U/unitedstatesc/unitedstatesc.htm (detailing facts of cable's
growth).
226. See Register of Copyright, Compulsory Licensing in the Television Industry (1990).
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1968, giving broadcasters, for the first time, a clear property right in
their signals.227
Yet at this stage these conflicts were between mature industries,
not incumbent and challenger. The example of the 1992
retransmission consent rules shows the difference. Had the courts
granted broadcasters such rights in 1961 (as common-law unfair
competition rights), the rights would have put cable development in
the control of broadcasters.228 In 1992, things were much different.
Congress described the cable industry not as a pirate, but as "a
dominant nationwide video medium."229 And when confronted with
demands for further payment, the cable networks asserted their power
and struck a not unfavorable deal.23° Cable's stance made it clear that
broadcast was now dependent on cable, and not vice versa. Their roles
had reversed.
E.

The Classic Communications Regime Arrives

The birth of the recording industry, radio broadcast, and. cable
created a pattern for setting copyright's communications policy. The
classic regime, as I have described its operation from 1900 to 1976, is
centered on the model of access fees, or compulsory licenses. New
technologies capable of delivering copyrighted content will be granted
access to the copyrighted works essential to their business, but for a
price. This basic approach was followed in several subsequent matters,
including satellite television in the 1980s231 and radio webcasting in the
1990s.232 The classic regime is therefore something of a default for
227. See Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L.
No. 102-385, § 2(a)(2)-(5), 106 Stat. 1460, 1460-61 (detailing the increase in cable
viewership).
228. For a description of efforts to obtain a common law right in signal, see supra text
accompanying notes 163-170.
229. Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act § 2(a)(3).
230. See Charles Lubinsky, Reconsidering Retransmission Consent: An Examination of
the Retransmission Consent Provision (47 U.S.C. § 325(b)) of the 1992 Cable Act, 49 FED.
COMM. L.J. 99, 144-49 (1996) (noting that instead of cash, most broadcasters exchanged their
retransmission consent for cable's agreement to carry additional channels); Christopher S.
Yoo, Rethinking the Commitment to Free, Local Television, 52 EMORY L.J. 1579, 1658-59
(2003) (same).
231 . The Satellite Home Viewer Act of 1988 created a compulsory license for satellite
broadcasting similar in structure to the cable compulsory license. Satellite Home Viewer Act
of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-667, 102 Stat. 3949 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 1 7
U.S.C).
232. Webcasters pay royalties for sound recordings according to a complicated scheme
first made law in the Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of 1995, Pub. L.
No. 104-39, 109 Stat. 336 (1995). For an overview of the political process that led to the
compulsory license, see Kimberly L. Craft, The Webcasting Music Revolution ls Ready to
Begin, as Soon as We Figure Out the Copyright Law: The Story of the Music Industry at War
with Itself, 24 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 1 (2001).
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industries that do not fit the model of exemptions, which are the
"new" copyright communications regime described in Part III.
For copyright theorists, the historical evolution of the classic
regime holds important lessons. However pure and true copyright's
goals of promoting authorship may be, the law will inevitably be used
by communications companies as an instrument of competitive
advantage. Copyright cannot help creating the baseline for
competition among disseminators. It creates communications policy
not by design but by necessity.
II.

POLICY

I have suggested that copyright has evolved to regulate
competition among rivals, that it in effect comprises independent
authorship and communications regimes, and that within the
communications regime has evolved a standing institutional practice
of using copyright to settle near-inevitable conflicts among rival
disseminators. These are descriptive claims. The second part addresses
the obvious policy questions that arise from study of copyright's
communications regime.
A.

Bottlenecks and Vertical Foreclosure

The economic analysis of authorship revolves around the
nonrivalrous nature of information goods and the problems thereby
created. Copyright's role in communications policy, conversely, is
more readily analyzed as the "bottleneck" problem deriving from
copyright's grant of control over an asset essential to market entry
(namely, copyrighted works), and the potential created for vertical
foreclosure of rivals. In this effort, it should be noted at the outset that
the goal of this section is to outline the argument as it appears in
telecommunications policy, and not conclusively defend the premise
that vertical foreclosure is problematic.233
To understand the model we must consider the conditions of
competition that face rival disseminators regulated by copyright.

233. That debate is addressed by a rich literature on vertical foreclosure. In general, see
Louis Kaplow, Extension of Monopoly Power Through Leverage, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 515
(1985); Janusz A. Ordover et al., Equilibrium Vertical Foreclosure, 80 AM. ECON. REV.
127 (1990); and Michael A. Salinger, Vertical Mergers and Market Foreclosure, 103 Q.J.
ECON. 345 (1988). With regard to telecommunications policy in particular, see Paul L.
Joskow & Roger G. Noll, The Bell Doctrine: Applications In Telecommunications,
Electricity, and Other Network Industries, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1249 (1999), and Alexander
Larson et al., Competitive Access Issues and Telecommunications Regulatory Policy, 20 J.
CONTEMP. L. 419 (1994). For an excellent overview of the economic arguments regarding
vertical integration and their relevance for communications policy, see Joseph Farrell &
Philip J. Weiser, Modularity, Vertical Integration, and Open Access Policies: Towards a
Convergence ofAntitrust and Regulation in the Internet Age, 17 HARV. L. & TECH. 85 (2003).
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Consider a disseminator to be anyone who owns a legally protected
means of communication with a customer:
FIGURE 3.1: COMMUNICATIONS MODEL

Service Provider

Legally Protected Link

Consumer

In the field of communications, the legally protected link pictured
here can take many forms. It can be physical, protected by the rules of
personal property: copper loops between the telephone company and
the consumer, the cable infrastructure, and so on. But the link can also
be a legal entitlement that does not reference any particular physical
infrastructure, such as the allocation of a certain spectrum frequency
to a broadcaster to reach its customers.234 From this arises a central
and recurring policy question: To what degree should the legal
protection afforded that bottleneck allow the owner to exploit his
ownership to maximum advantage?
Two potential abuses of bottleneck power are of particular interest
and recur in the study of communications law. The first is the simple
problem of monopoly price-setting.235 The incumbent should be
expected to charge a supra-competitive price if its ownership of the
protected link makes it the only entity in a position to provide the
service in question. In telecommunications law this problem has
traditionally led to extensive government rate-setting, such as the
setting of local telephone rates.236
The second is the problem of vertical foreclosure: the use of the
protected link to prevent a competing disseminator, or challenger,
who depends on the link, from reaching the customer in question. The
foreclosure is "vertical" because the incumbent uses its control over

234. See 47 U.S.C. § 307 (2000) (containing procedures for federal grants of licenses to
broadcast spectrum).
235. INGO VOGELSANG & BRIDGER M. MITCHELL, TELECOMMUNICATIONS
COMPETITION: THE LAST TEN MILES 55-58 (1997) (discussing the effect of bottlenecks on
price-setting policy).
236. See 2 HARVEY ZUCKMAN ET AL., MODERN COMMUNICATION LAW § 9.2 (1999)
(describing various aspects of rate setting for local carriers).
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an independent input at another level (copyrighted materials) to affect
competition at the level of dissemination.237
FIGURE 3.2: VERTICAL FORECLOSURE VIA B OTILENECK
Incumbent Service Provider

Legally Protected Link

Challenger Service Provider

Foreclosure

Consumer

An illustration of the vertical foreclosure problem comes from the
example of long distance telephone service. If the incumbent (Bell)
owns the local telephone lines, it can potentially foreclose a long
distance service provider (MCI) from reaching any customers,
favoring Bell's own long distance service. Hence a critical question for
telecommunications law has always been determining the extent to
which the owner of the local phone service should be required to
provide access to local lines to vendors of long-distance telephone
service.238
Both problems stemming from the bottleneck are central to most
contemporary communications policy: wireline regulation, broadband
regulation and spectrum policy are three current examples. In each
case the basic problem is the same. On the one hand, allowing the
incumbent too much power to prevent challengers from reaching
customers retards both price competition and innovation in new
communications technologies. Yet granting too little legal protection
to the original link might erase the incentives to build the original link
and its technological successors.
With some simplifying assumptions, it is not hard to see how
copyright law can be used as a potential tool for monopoly price
setting or vertical foreclosure, raising the same questions faced in
communications.239 The vertical foreclosure problem is evident from
the story of the broadcast and cable industries in the 1960s.240 Each
possessed its own technology for reaching consumers, yet each needed

237. Whether copyrighted materials are described as upstream or downstream is largely
a semantic issue. The foreclosure is vertical in either case.
238. See 2 HARVEY ZUCKMAN ET AL., MODERN COMMUNICATION LAW § 9.1 (1999)
(describing the various access issues addressed by the Telecommunications Act of 1996).
239. Cf Picker, supra note 22.
240. See supra Part I.D.3.b.
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access to copyrighted works in order to provide a service that
customers would pay for. The copyrighted works were the bottleneck
necessary to compete in the industry. Therefore, if the broadcast
industry (the incumbent) could have enforced the copyrights in
television content, it could have prevented the cable industry from
reaching television customers. It could have achieved similar results to
what the telephone industry might achieve by controlling local phone
lines.
FIGURE 3.3: COPYRIGHT USED FOR VERTICAL FORECLOSURE
Copyrighted Content

Incumbent Dissemi nator

Challenger

Consumer

The vertical foreclosure model, however, only describes one class
of communication problems that arises in the copyright context. The
problems of monopoly price-setting can also occur. This has happened
in situations where authors maintain independent control of their
copyrights, as in the ASCAP-radio dispute described above.241 The
communications model for the ASCAP problem is a horizontal cartel
among the suppliers of copyrighted works (authors), leading to
monopoly price-setting. The necessity of having access to content and
the legal protection of copyright creates the possibility of an ASCAP
cartel in the first place.
FIGURE 3.4: THE DIFFERENCE THAT AUTHORIAL CONTROL MAKES

ASCAP Cartel

Dissemi nator

Dissemi nator

Consumer

241. See supra Part I.D.2.
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There is an important difference between the problems created by
the horizontal (ASCAP) and vertical (broadcast) competition
problems. While a horizontal cartel among authors may be expected
to raise consumer prices, it will not necessarily block market entry or
technological innovation. For economic theories that take innovation,
as opposed to price competition, as the primary engine of economic
growth,242 the vertical foreclosure problem is more serious.
All of this goes to show that copyright law's protections can and do
create the same competition problems regularly encountered in
telecommunications law. None of this is to suggest that the best way of
dealing with these problems is self-evident. Sizable disagreement
exists over what, if any, government role is appropriate in the face of
potential vertical foreclosure or monopoly price-setting.243 Yet over
the years positions have hardened and it is easier to understand the
choices available. What follows describes the policy alternatives that
have emerged.
B.

National Communications Policy

To understand the choices faced in copyright we must turn to the
subject of national communications policy. There have long existed
two basic models of the optimal communications policy: the
"stewardship" model and "competitive" (or "open") model.244 Both
models have a pedigree in national communications policy, though the
latter is dominant today.
1.

Stewardship Communications Policy

A steward-based communications policy245 is premised on the
grant, to private parties, of clear and uncontestable property
entitlements in future media and technologies. The rationale for such
grants is the premise that the private owner of such a grant will, in the
interest of profit maximization, efficiently steward the growth of an

242. See, e.g. , JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY
81-86 (3d ed. 1950).
243. For a useful normative overview of when governmental intervention may be
justified to prevent vertical integration, see Farrell & Weiser, supra note 233.
244. For another description of these two models in the internet context, see Philip J.
Weiser, The Internet, Innovation, and Intellectual Property Policy, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 534,
568-83 (2003).
245. Advocates will sometimes describe this as a "deregulatory" communications
policy, .. This language is difficult to support when it is a copyright system, a form of
regulation, that is conferring the right to block or license market entry. See Maureen Ryan,
Cyberspace as Public Space: A Public Trust Paradigm for Copyright in a Digital World, 79
ORE. L. REV. 647, 694-95 (2000).
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efficient communications system and the development of new
technologies.246
The stewardship model has historically enjoyed many arguments in
its favor, including support from economist Joseph Schumpeter.247
Chief among them is the view that the dominant firm can be expected
to internalize what would otherwise be externalities in a competitive
scenario. For example, competitors may have incentives to free-ride
on the research efforts of others, while a dominant incumbent has no
such option. Similarly, a dominant incumbent may exercise quality
control to prevent shoddy products from being used on its system.248
The problem of natural monopoly also drives the argument for a
steward-based communications policy. Economists have argued that
with economies of scale and scope characterizing the production of
telecommunications services, monopoly is the likely outcome.249 If
monopoly is inevitable in communications markets, a policy that
directs the monopolist to secure innovation and act in the public
interest may seem the only recourse.
Relatedly, a steward-based communications policy also avoids
much arguably wasteful duplication. The dominant market player can
avoid duplicative investments for the transmission of the same
information to the same consumer (such as two sets of telephone lines,
or two different printings of the same book). This is the argument for
allowing communications infrastructures to take the form of natural
monopolies. And pertaining to technological innovation, the dominant
player can prevent duplicative races to reach the same invention,
much like preventing multiple missions to pursue the same sunken
treasure. 250
As a model of innovation, the planned view shares much with the
"prospect theory" of patent law, which holds that control centralized
in a pioneer industry allows a more orderly process of follow-on
innovation.251 The costs of conflict, or "rent dissipation," may be
eliminated if broad, enforceable rights are granted to the pioneer

246. This stewardship model is similar to the "prospect theory" of patent protection. See
'
Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265
(1977).
247. See JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 100-06
(3d ed. 1950).
248. Cf Douglas Lichtman, Property Rights in Emerging Platform Technologies, 29 J.
LEGAL STUD. 615 (2000) (arguing that intellectual property Jaw should encourage price
coordination in emerging technology contexts).
249. See VOGELSANG & MITCHELL, supra note 235, at 51 (describing natural monopoly
as one justification for telecommunications regulation).
250. Cf POSNER, supra note 49, at 35-38 (examining rent dissipation theory by analyzing
costs through the example of a hunt for sunken treasure).
251. See Kitch, supra note 246.
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industry, creating a prospect that can be explored without fear of
competition.
Finally, the stewardship model's greatest appeal for many is that it
implies a much simpler (though not necessarily reduced)
governmental role. The government need only assign and enforce
property rights; it need not decide whether its grants of property rights
are improperly blocking market entry. The incumbent industry does
so itself.
In short, the vision of the stewardship model relies on a distrust of
government in favor of the developmental wisdom of an incumbent
communications industry. The model claims simplicity, efficiency and
a limited role for the state.
2.

"Competitive" Communications Policy

A "competitive" or "open" communications policy sacrifices the
order, predictability and stability of a planned policy for greater
allowance of market entry and (backers believe) faster technological
development.252
Competitive communications policies are premised on the belief
that technical innovation plays a central role in economic growth, and
that technical change is best understood as an evolutionary process.
These ideas also claim their origin in Joseph Schumpeter's work, but
their roots lie in his conception that "creative destruction" is the
source of capitalism's benefits, not mere price competition.253
Economists like Richard Nelson argue that technological change is by
necessity an error-driven, evolutionary process.254 Markets select from
a variety of competing approaches whose relative merits are otherwise
difficult to assess in advance.255
This view leads to distrust of the stewardship model and dominant
firm theories. If the most promising path of development is difficult to
predict in advance, Nelsonites argue, it is unrealistic to expect a single
company to take the optimal path of technological development,
however well-intentioned it may be. This problem is compounded if
any single party can be expected to have anything less than perfect
decisionmaking skills resulting from, for example, a predisposition to
252 See Mark A. Lemley and Lawrence Lessig, The End of End-to-End: Preserving the
Architecture ofthe Internet in the Broadband Era, 48 UCLA L. REV. 925, 961 (2001).
253. See SCHUMPETER, supra note 247, at 81-86.
254. See, e.g., RICHARD R. NELSON & SIDNEY G. WINTER, AN EVOLUTIONARY
THEORY OF ECONOMIC CHANGE 14-21 (1982); John Ziman, Evolutionary Models for
Technological Change, in TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION AS AN EVOLUTIONARY PROCESS
3 (John Ziman ed., 2000).
255. See NELSON & WINTER, supra note 254, at 15 ("[E)volutionary theory [recognizes)
that there are stochastic [random) elements both in the determination of decisions and of
decision outcomes.").
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continue with current ways of doing business.256 Along similar lines,
legal theorists argue that vesting control over improvement in a single
figure creates an enormous risk of stagnancy deriving from the danger
of an incumbent industry's disinterest in change.257
The competitive model usually suggests a more active
governmental role, particularly in removing barriers to market entry.
In this model the government is pictured (ideally) as something like a
beneficent gardener, trying to preserve conditions for innovation while
simultaneously preventing a dominant firm from choking new growth.
If innovation does indeed occur the way Nelsonites believe, greater
government involvement may be necessary to prevent industrial and
technological stagnation.
3.

The Consensus Position

Whatever the substantive merits of these two approaches to
communications policy, as a descriptive matter, some version of the
competitive model has dominated national communications policy
since the mid-1980s.258 It is true that there remains much disagreement
on how competition is best promoted and, in particular, how intrusive
a role government should play. Yet the FCC and Congress now
uniformly adhere to the model of competitive innovation.
Things were not always tipped in favor of the competitive model.
The balance of twentieth century communications policy was driven,
instead, by a stewardship model, a model most clearly apparent in the
Bell System's stewardship of the national telephone system. The Bell
Company is the definitive model of the regulated monopolist asked to
implement the public policy aspirations of national communications
policy.259 Yet from the late 1960s onward, the courts, the FCC and
finally Congress began a slow migration to the now-dominant
competitive communications model. Glen Robinson describes the
thirty-year shift as "one of the stunning achievements of modern
public policy, the transformation of a staid and stagnant industry into
the most dynamic and rapidly growing industry in the modern

256. See NELSON & WINTER, supra note 254, at 72-95 (discussing the concept of
organizational "skills").
257. See, e.g. , Robert P. Merges and Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of
Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839, 890-94 (1990) (criticizing the stewardship model in the
patent context). This is also an animating principle of Lawrence Lessig's work, particularly
The Future of Ideas. See LESSIG, supra note 1 .
258. See, e.g. , GERALD w. BROCK, TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY FOR THE
INFORMATION AGE (1994); Glen 0. Robinson, The Titanic Remembered: A T& T and the
Changing World of Telecommunications, 5 YALE J. ON REG. 517, 520-31 (1988) (recounting
the history of telecommunications policy).
259. See Robinson, supra note 258, at 517 (describing the Bell System).
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economy."260 As he argues, it "did not come about through technology
alone; it came about by rethinking notions about natural monopoly,
[and] economies of scale and scope - concepts near and dear to the
ancient regime. "261
There are many legal milestones in the policy migration. The most
notable and dramatic was the 1984 breakup of the AT&T monopoly
by federal judge Harold Green.262 But the clearest legislative
manifestation of this policy shift is the 1996 Telecom Act,263 the central
statute of communications law. As the FCC explains, the law was
meant "to let any communications business compete in any market
against any other. "264 While the Act is far too complicated to
summarize, its most important and best-known change is the
authorization of open competition in both local and long-distance
telephone services.265 These changes are a sharp break from previous
policies, which still adhered to the Bell model. And while assessments
of the success of 1996 Act's promotion of competition are mixed,266 its
policy is clear.
Stated adherence to the competitive model of communications
policy is now de rigueur for the FCC. Across every area of st�ted
policy, the FCC states goals that could have been drafted by Richard
Nelson. The competitive goal of the FCC is to "support the Nation's
economy by ensuring that there is a comprehensive and sound
competitive framework for communications services . . . foster[ing]
innovation and offer[ing] consumers meaningful choice in services." In
the contentious area of broadband, the FCC aims to "establish
regulatory policies that promote competition, innovation, and
investment in broadband service." Or as Commission Chairman

260. Glen 0. Robinson, The "New" Communications Act: A Second Opinion, 29 CONN.
L. REV. 289, 304 (1996).
261. Id. (emphasis omitted).
262. The breakup of AT&T is recounted in detail in GERALD R. FAULHABER
TELECOMMUNICATIONS IN TuRMOIL: TECHNOLOGY AND PUBLIC POLICY (1988).
263. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996) (codified as
amended in scattered portions of 47 U.S.C.).
264. See Federal Communications Commission, Telecommunications Act of 1996, at
http://www.fcc.gov/telecom.html (updated Mar. 29, 2004).
265. See 47 U.S.C. § 251 (2000).
266. The Act's effort to create more local telephone competition is widely described as a
"failure." See, e.g., Reza Dibadj, Competive Debacle in Local Telephony: Is the 1996 Telecom
Act to Blame?, 81 WASH. U. L. 1, 2-6 (2003) (summarizing academic, judicial, and public
critiques of the 1996 Telecom Act). However, it is credited by some for opening up the
market for telecommunications services more generally. See, e.g., Corey Grice, How the
Telecom Act created a new breed of speed, CNET News, at http://news.com.com/20091033_3-251796.html (Feb. 1, 2001) (last visited Sept. 30, 2004) (arguing that the 1996 Act set
off the expansion and development of broadband internet access).
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Michael Powell puts it, the FCC must do what is necessary to foster
"competitive innovation. "267
Much of this, of course, is at a certain level of abstraction, and
there is much debate over what policies will, in fact, facilitate
competitive innovation in the communications industry. But in the
areas of communications law outside of copyright law, the existence of
a basic consensus is notable. The starting point for debate is the view
that open communications competition drives innovation and
economic growth. The question is what role copyright law plays in that
vision.
C.

Copyright's Classic Communications Policy

How can copyright's classic communications policy best be
described in terms of the models described here? Copyright's record
is, of course, complicated and inconsistent. There are also too few
examples to come to a definite conclusion. Yet it is notable that, when
faced with the potential problem of vertical foreclosure - copyright
creating bars to market entry by disseminators - copyright's rules
have often bent to prevent an incumbent from using copyright to
control a technological challenger. Stated differently, the courts and
Congress have in practice avoided a stewardship model of
communications and delivered results closer to a competitive model of
communications policy.
As the history explained above demonstrates, when faced with
potential lockout, the copyright system avoided granting incumbent
disseminators full control over a technologically advanced rival (the
same also holds for cases not recounted above).268 Instead, both
incumbent and challenger were forced to put their case to the
government and to invest in efforts to steer policy in their favored
direction.
Obviously things could have been different. With just a few
decisions the Supreme Court could have easily steered the law toward
the stewardship model, trusting the incumbent to direct the
subsequent development of cable, the recording industry, or the
photocopier. As Jane Ginsburg has argued, many of the pro
challenger Supreme Court decisions, from White-Smith to Fortnightly,
can be impossible to understand without some idea that the Court

267. Michael K. Powell, Remarks at the Silicon Flatirons Symposium on "The Digital
Broadband Migration: Toward a Regulatory Regime for the Internet Age" at the University
of Colorado School of Law (Feb. 8, 2004).
268. The other major example is that of the photocopier, which was exempted from
copyright protection in Williams & Wilkins Co. v. U.S., 487 F.2d 1345 (Ct. Cl. 1973), affd,
420 U.S. 376 (1975) (constituting an equally divided Supreme Court). For a wonderful
account of the photocopier saga, see GOLDSTEIN, supra note 20.
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feared that the incumbent wanted copyright for the wrong reasons.269
Similarly, the most common statutory form of settlement, the
compulsory license, is a liability scheme that prevents market lockout
while compensating the incumbent. Such a scheme, as discussed
above, is inconsistent with a steward model of communications policy.
Even though the classic communications regime mainly reflected
an open model of communications policy, it must be admitted that no
self-conscious reasoning can be found to that effect in the caselaw or
in other sources. The main communications cases, like Teleprompter,
are almost entirely free of any policy-based explanations for the
courts' decisions.
D.

Understanding the Critiques of the Classic Communications
Regime

With this framework of analysis in mind, we are in a better
position to understand the criticism of what I have termed copyright's
classic communications regime. The practice from 1900-1976 has never
been terribly popular. Both contemporary and present copyright
commentators have attacked its operation for a range of reasons most of which, I argue, miss the point. While there are reasons to
disfavor the competitive model of communications policy, it seems
rare that critics of the process actually refer to them.
As early as 1903 the Copyright Office began to argue that a revised
copyright statute should be flexible enough to deal with new
technologies as they arose. The Office argued in its report that
copyright "ought to be dealt with as a whole, and not by further
merely partial or temporizing amendments."270 It stated that the "acts
now in force should be replaced by one consistent statute, of simple
and direct phraseology."271 With greater force and effect in 1 961, the
Office argued for a copyright law that would be "broad enough to
include not only those forms in which copyrightable works are now
being produced, but also new forms which are invented or come into
use later. "272 These are very common arguments. Many copyright
thinkers argue that the 1909 Act and other early acts were too clumsy,

269. See Ginsburg, supra note 20, at 1617 ("(W]hen copyright owners seek to eliminate a
new kind of dissemination, and when courts do not deem that dissemination harmful to
copyright owners, courts decline to find infringement, even though the legal and economic
analyses that support those determinations often seem strained, not to say disingenuous."
(emphasis in original)).
270. See Thorvald Solberg, Copyright Law Reform, 35 YALE L. J. 48, 62 (1925)
(reprinting Report on Copyright Legislation, Dec. 1, 1903).
271. Id.
272. Staff of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 87th Cong., Report of the Register of
Copyrights on the General Revision of the U.S. Copyright Law 11 (Comm. Print 1961).
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requiring amendment or difficult judicial interpretation for each new
technology.
It is true that the pre-1976 Acts produced uncertainty as to the
rights of a copyright owner. But such uncertainty can also advance a
communications policy that favors new entry. A simpler law can
nonetheless be a bad law; the value of clarity must be weighed against
such larger concerns. It might be said that the problem with statutory
ambiguity is that it has encouraged parties to invest in efforts to gain
favorable government action. That is true, but it is also true that
forcing parties to come to the government could have forced both
sides to present information that may have led to better and earlier
settlements. 273
Some academics have criticized the classic model's tendency
toward compulsory licensing on different economic grounds. Robert
Merges has argued that enforcing property entitlements is more likely
to promote the private bargaining necessary for creation of "collective
rights organizations," such as the ASCAP.274 The value of collective
rights organizations, according to Merges, is that they are better than
compulsory licensing schemes · for reducing the transaction costs of
licensing a diverse mixture of copyrights. Merges argues that
policymakers should in all cases "stay away from compulsory licensing
for new media! "275
Merges, in collaboration with Richard Nelson, has criticized the
stewardship model of innovation in the patent context276; his position
with respect to copyright can be tested against his own arguments.
Merges takes the purpose of compulsory licensing schemes to be the
reduction of transaction costs - he does not account for the role a
liability regime might play in market entry of new technologies. The
earlier Merges teaches that intellectual property's "social costs should
include its potential to reduce competition in the market for
improvements" and "there are many instances when a firm that
thought it had control over a broad technology rested on its laurels
until jogged to action by an outside threat."277 If this is so with respect
to patent holders, why don't the same considerations suggest scrutiny
of copyright? In addition, Merges relies on the ASCAP as an
alternative model to compulsory licensing, but the analogy is
inapposite, for several reasons.

273. Cf Ian Ayres & Eric Talley, Solomonic Bargaining: Dividing a Legal Entitlement to
Facilitate Coasean Trade, 104 YALE L.J. 1027, 1036-72 (1995).
274. See Robert Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property Rights
and Collective Rights Organizations, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1293 (1996).
275. See id. at 1300.
276. See Merges & Nelson, supra note 257.
277. Id. at 843, 872.
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The ASCAP is a coalition of authors. As a model it is therefore no
answer for the problems created when rival disseminators use
copyright against another rival. As long as the disseminator in a given
industry has effective control or actual ownership of copyright
necessary to its business model, the ASCAP model is not a viable
alternative. The compulsory licensing regimes that Merges opposes
are (as Section II.A points out), solutions to a different problem:
vertical foreclosure of one disseminator by another. The ASCAP
model is only viable where authors have sufficiently independent
power and control over their own copyrights. As for the subject of
pricing, the fact that the ASCAP's independent pricing scheme was set
in the shadow of an antitrust decree278 renders questionable the
argument that the ASCAP's pricing is fully independent of
government supervision.
A final argument against the compulsory licensing model rests on
the proposition that broad property entitlements are attractive
because they will speed technological development. As Peter Huber,
John Thorne and Michael Kellog state this argument in their 1995
treatise, granting broadcasters immediate rights over cable would have
hastened its development:
It is interesting to speculate how differently things might have developed
if the Supreme Court had affirmed both cable's copyright obligations and
its First Amendment rights simply and clearly at the outset . . . . Without
a right to pull signals at will from the air, cable might have started up
more slowly, but it would probably then have grown more quickly.279

Huber and his compatriots are proposing the stewardship model of
communications policy. Their belief is that simple, clear and broad
entitlements, unfettered by any regulation, will lead to the optimal
deployment and development of communication technologies.
As discussed in Section 11.B, the wisdom of such an approach must
take into account the objections stemming from evolutionary theories
of innovation. This point can be expressed in terms of the bottleneck
problem described in Part II.A. For any form of expressive work (such
as video, book, or music) there exist several potential technologies of
dissemination. Yet not every method of dissemination is invented at
the same time, and indeed many cannot be predicted ex ante. For
example, the pioneering system of mass television dissemination was
terrestrial broadcast - rabbit-ear antennas and tall towers. In time
various successive technologies of mass video dissemination were
developed and reduced to practice, including wire (cable television),
satellite, and most recently, streaming applications on the Internet.

278. See United States v. Am. Soc'y of Composers, Authors & Publishers, 1950 Trade
Cas. (CCH) 'lI 62,595 at 63,751 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).
279. See JOHN THORNE ET AL., FEDERAL BROADBAND LAW § 10.11 (1995).
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From these conditions we can see that granting a copyright
entitlement that covers all forms of dissemination will have the effect
of giving the pioneer industry the power to control the follow-on
development of technology. Assuming that the pioneer controls the
creation of content (either by controlling copyrights, vertical
integration, or through simple economic dependence), it can dictate
what happens and what does not. In the example of broadcast, if
copyright in programming had clearly included future technologies
like cable and satellite transmission, the decision to allow these
dissemination technologies to develop would have rested with the
broadcast industry.280 Everything then depends on whether
policymakers believe that an incumbent can be trusted to promote,
rather than to destroy, its technological rivals.
Finally, there are a second set of reasons to question the model of
broad initial entitlements. The model can only yield the claimed
benefits when the entitlements can actually be enforced. For example,
copyright was generally seen as unenforceable against casual home
copying in the 1970s and early 1 980s.281 While this point is complicated
by improved technologies of copy protection, so long as there exist
rights that would be extremely expensive to enforce, the model of
broad initial grants cannot be a complete answer.
In short, while there is much automatic support for a "flexible" or
"future-proof" copyright, there seems less consideration of whether
such a law would be good for innovation. The argument, however, can
be made, and Peter Huber comes closest to making it. But while not
conclusive, much recent economic thinking and even mainstream
communications policy casts doubt on a model that grants the
incumbent control over future inventions.
E.

Author-Driven Communications Policy?

The analysis in this Part should make one thing clear: who owns or
controls the relevant copyrights in an industry sets the nature of the
competition and communications problems created. Authorial control
of copyrights (as in the case of the ASCAP) will lead to potential
pricing problems, but is less likely to lead to the problem of vertical
foreclosure. Conversely, it is when an incumbent disseminator owns,
or has effective control over, copyright that the potential for more
troubling efforts to foreclose technological rivals emerges.
This analysis makes the possibility of author-driven dissemination
attractive. As a policy it would support broad and clear rights in
280. Accord Trotter Hardy, Copyright and "New-Use" Technologies, 23 NOVA L. REV.
657 (1999) (discussing new-use technology royalty obligations using "type-I" and "type-II"
error methodology).
281. See infra note 342 and accompanying text.
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authors; authors should want maximum exposure for their work,
regardless of dissemination media. And if an author decided not to
release her works using a given technology (say, film), then we might
expect this to reflect artistic, rather than anti-competitive, concerns.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, this concept has been a long-time
aspiration of copyright law: the hope that authors would one day
become masters of their own destiny.282 In its latest form, the idea is
that the emergence of digital media and the Internet may make
authors the relevant actors for copyright's communications policy.
Jane Ginsburg's words describe this school of thought: "I suggest that
digital media, by making the means of production and dissemination
available to any computer-equipped author, give authors a realistic
opportunity to bring their works to the public without having to put
themselves in thrall to traditional intermediaries. "283 A grant of greater
authorial rights through copyright, according to Ginsburg, "not only
enhances the moral appeal of the exercise of copyright, but also may
offer the public an increased quantity and variety of works of
authorship. "284
If authorial control over copyrights could help control some of the
most troubling anti-competitive consequences of copyright, how
achievable is that vision? The problem remains what it always has
been. Despite the fact that authors who are not employees nominally
own copyrights upon creation, they rarely control copyrights. Most
copyrights are contractually assigned to disseminators, owned by the
employer through the work-for-hire doctrine, or otherwise effectively
controlled by the disseminator.285 It is a function of the relative
bargaining power of authors and disseminators. Unless this difference
in power or the laws controlling copyright contracting changes, true
authorial control of copyright will likely remain an attractive vision
but not a discernable reality.
Might digital dissemination technologies change things by
strengthening the relative power of authors, as Ginsburg suggests?
282 See, e.g. , LYMAN RAY PATTERSON, COPYRIGHT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 5
(1968) ("Not until after the Statute of Anne did the modem idea of copyright as a right of
the author develop."). See generally LOEWENSTEIN, supra note 33.
283. Ginsburg, supra note 20, at 1619.
284. Id. Paul Goldstein's vision of a "celestial jukebox" that stores all copyright works
and makes them available on demand is also an author-driven vision. He writes: "by
charging subscribers electronically for each use of the prerecorded works it offers - motion
pictures, sound recordings, books, magazines, or newspaper articles - the celestial jukebox
will be able to compensate copyright owners each time their works are chosen." See
GOLDSTEIN, supra note 20, at 23.
285. See, e.g., ALBERT N. GRECO, THE BOOK PuBLISHING INDUSTRY 152-55 (1997)
(providing a sample of typical publishing contract assigning copyright to publisher); Bruce
H. Phillips & Carl R. Moore, Digital Performance Royalties: Should Radio Pay?, 3 VAND. J.
ENT. L. & PRAC. 169 n.28 (2001) (noting that copyrights in the music industry are typically
assigned to publishers and recording companies).

340

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 103:278

While the question is empirical, there are reasons to suspect that
developments like the Internet or indeed any technologies are unlikely
to eliminate the central role of disseminators and other intermediaries
and their continued control over copyright.
It is, first of all, hard to get rid of intermediaries for a reason
having nothing to do with law or technology, but instead stemming
from the basic theory of comparative advantage.286 Specialized
intermediaries exist, after all, because they specialize in doing things
that others do not necessarily do well themselves. Carpenters
specialize in making furniture; while it is possible for others to make
their own furniture, it comes at great tangible and opportunity cost.
The logic of specialization carries over to the world of packaged
information and suggests a continuing role for specialized
disseminators. Authors, after constructing their own furniture, could
also serve as their own publishers and publicists. But the author who
does so will usually be at a disadvantage compared to one who
collaborates with someone else, particularly someone like a publisher,
who specializes in publication and publicity. Changes in technology
have not changed that basic dynamic, even though today's
intermediaries have changed.
While we are only a decade into the universalization of the
Internet, there is limited evidence that it has eliminated the control
that disseminators have over copyrights. There are a few examples of
authors - often famous and rich - who have temporarily become
their own disseminators. Stephen King, for example, famously
distributed one of his books directly to his fans.287 Rapper Ice-T
decided to distribute one of his albums, for $4.99 per copy, via the
online distribution service KaZaA.288 Yet these are the exceptions.
Even the Beatles, who founded Apple Records to give artists more
power over their work,289 have many of their sound recording
copyrights controlled by publisher EMI. That company has used its
ownership of the Beatles' copyrights to prevent unauthorized remixing

286. The seminal statement of the theory of comparative advantage was made by David
Ricardo. See DAVID RICARDO, PRINCIPLES OF POLillCAL ECONOMY AND TAXATION
(Prometheus Books 1996) (1817). See also Jack Goldsmith & Timothy Wu, The Return of
the Leviathan ch. 4 (manuscript on file with author) (developing the point with regard to
online activities).
287. See Stephen King offers online thrills, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., July 24, 2000, at
A5.
288. See Ice T offers album for sale to music-swap site users, USA TODAY, April 10,
2003, at http://www.usatoday.com/tech/webguide/internetlife/2003-04-10-icet-kazaa_x.htm
(last visited Sept. 9, 2004).
289. See generally BRUCE SPIZER, THE BEATLES ON APPLE RECORDS (2003)
(describing reasons for the founding of Apple Records).
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in rap songs, when it is not clear whether the Beatles themselves
would have cared.290
In short, despite centuries of good intentions, the goal of moving
actual, as opposed to notional, control over copyright to authors
remains unachieved. It remains for many an aspiration of copyright
policy, and a communications analysis suggests the aspiration has
independent economic justifications. But in the meantime, copyright
theorists must continue to analyze a world in which various
disseminators are the effective owners of copyright. This fact makes
copyright's role in communications policy more, not less, important.
III. COPYRIGHT'S NEW COMMUNICATIONS POLICY
The main point of this Article has been to describe copyright's
communications regime and to explain the choices it has been making.
Up to this point we have focused on the "classic" communications
regime, centered on compulsory licensing. Since the passage of the
1976 Act, the legal operation of copyright's communications policy has
shifted in important and fundamental ways - enough to identify and
describe a "new" communications regime.
A. A Changing Code
The 1976 Act marked an effort to solve many of copyright's
perceived communications-related problems once and for all. A key
portion of the 1976 Act was the section 102 specification that
copyright would subsist in "original works of authorship fixed in any
tangible medium of expression, now known or later developed. . "291
As the House Report explained, " [u]nder the bill it makes no
difference what the form, manner, or medium of fixation may be."292
One hope was that the 1976 Act might "future-proof" the copyright
code.
It was not to be. As this Article has argued, conflict between
dissemination rivals is probably inevitable as long as technological
change creates the opportunity to undercut incumbents. It should
therefore be no surprise that the 1976 Act failed to end the pattern of
conflict that characterizes copyright's history. Since that time, some
challenges, such as satellite television and web-casting, have followed
the classic pattern of copyright settlement centered on a compulsory
license arrangement.293 But many of the technological challenges, from
.

.

290. Noah Shachtman, Copyright Enters a Gray Area, WIRED NEWS, Feb. 14, 2004, at
http://www.wired.com/news/print/0,1294,62276,00.html (last visited Sept. 13, 2004).
291. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000) (emphasis added).
292. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 52 (1976).
293. With results codified in 17 U.S.C. § 119 and § 114, respectively.
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the VCR to the Digital Audio Tape (DAT) and onward have been
handled in a very new manner, suggesting changes in the political
economy of disseminator regulation.
The best evidence of the change comes from the study of the
copyright code itself. As David Nimmer has shown to great effect, we
have witnessed a dramatic shift in the nature of copyright amendment
over the last decade.294 Nimmer identifies a major turning point in the
year 1 992. After that year, says Nimmer, "each amendment outdoes its
predecessor, not only for incoherence that commands national
attention, but for pioneering new methods of bringing the legislative
process into disrepute."295 The post-1992 amendments, according to
Nimmer, consist of "bloated provisions that do not meet the various
criteria of formal lawmaking success. "296
While Nimmer is focused on the form of copyright amendments, a
simple read of the code confirms that something has indeed changed.
First, the code now contains entire chapters, such as the anti
bootlegging statute in section 1101, the anti-circumvention laws in
section 1201, and part of the Audio Home Recording Act in section
1008 that clearly regulate end-user behavior. Coupled with the
enlargement of criminal liability in the 1997 No Electronic Theft Act,
they constitute what can be described as an "anti-piracy" code and
compromise some of the first, clearly-stated prohibitions on the
behavior of non-commercial users in copyright's history.
Second, since 1992, the law has witnessed the addition of the first
technology specific safe harbor regimes: section 1001 et seq, the safe
harbors for digital audio recording devices, and section 5 12, the safe
harbor regime for online service providers. While compulsory
licensing regimes for specific technologies were a central feature of the
classic regime, the safe harbor regimes are an obvious break from that
model.
Third, in addition to these statutory changes, since the early 1980s,
the Sony rule has emerged as a key doctrine for determining the
liability of manufacturers of devices that facilitate copying. The Sony
rule is premised not on any provision of the copyright statute, but
rather on judge-made secondary and vicarious liability principles, and
represents a new type of judge-mediated communications policy.
These three developments - the rise of end-user sanction regimes,
safe harbors and judicially-managed market entry regimes - clearly
require a new model for their political explanation. The next Section
presents such a model.

294. See David Nimmer, Codifying Copyright Comprehensibly, 51 UCLA L. REV. 1233,
1238 (2004).
295. Id. at 1381-82.
296. Id. at 1238.
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A Model for the Copyright's New Communications Regime

A central premise of the classic model was that new copyright law
emerges from conflicts between technological incumbents and
challengers. I suggest that the same basic model can help explain much
of the post-1976 transformation of copyright's communications policy
and copyright law in general. The principal difference is institutional:
it is a transformation in the identity of the challenger, and a
corresponding change in the government protection sought.
Douglass North has suggested that there are only two sources of
institutional change: changes in relative prices and changes in tastes.297
The changes to copyright's communications regime described here can
be succinctly described as the result of three distinct changes in
relative prices. From the period of 1970-2000, three products became
dramatically cheaper: analog copying technology (home tape
recorders and VCRs), digital copying technology (the computer, and
later devices like CD-burners) and, finally, mass distribution
technology (the Internet). One upshot of these changes was the
emergence of a new type of technological challenger to the copyright
world.
The new challenger can best be pictured as a team effort. The team
consists of passive, enabling technologists paired with infringing
users.298 Both have clearly identifiable interests in undercutting the
incumbent. The technologist earns extra profits from providing users
the ability to disseminate works without paying for permission. (A
tape recorder is valuable not only for playing tapes, but also for its
ability to record music that can be given to friends.) The infringing
user does not profit (other than possibly in reputation) but saves, by
not having to pay retail prices for copyrighted works.299 In short,
infringing users equipped with copying technology take on the
economic role previously occupied by challenger industries.
These changes have transformed the political economy of
copyright. Post-1976 copyright has pitted incumbents against two
challengers: passive technological rivals and infringing users. The
297. See DOUGLASS NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE, AND ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE 89 (1990).
298. Some may object that the term "infringing users" states a legal conclusion. I use the
term only as shorthand to denote users who incumbent disseminators see as a threat to their
revenue.
299. On the behavior of infringing users and their interests, I have previously noted the
tension between infringing users as a sub-group and users at large. See Wu, supra note 45, at
683-84 ("[T)he sub-group of P2P users, young and computer-savvy, can take advantage of
the continued compliance of regular consumers. The mass of regular users pay for the works,
thereby maintaining incentives for artists to create them, while the P2P sub-group defects en
masse . . . . ") ; see also Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Charismatic Code, Social Norms and the
Emergence of Cooperation on the File-Swapping Networks, 89 VA. L. REV. 505 (2003)
(explaining behavior on P2P networks).
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result is two new streams of copyright law that have emerged like
plumes from twin exhaust pipes.
The first stream consists of new copyright rules for the passive
technologists: electronics manufacturers and telecommunications
firms. These rules differ from some of the copyright settlements that
have come before, for several reasons. First, in the conflicts that
follow, the settlements have not taken the form of compulsory licenses
but of safe harbors. The technologists are not interested in compulsory
licenses because they do not need access to copyrighted works and
hence do not bargain for them. The most important legal output from
these conflicts are the Sony regime (a judge-run immunity scheme)
and the safe harbor scheme for Internet Service Providers codified in
section 512. Second, the technologists are more effective at influencing
government than were their predecessors. When, for example, Sony or
Bell Atlantic first began to offer dissemination technologies to their
consumers, they were not startups but established and powerful firms,
with long experience lobbying government. Their model was not
entrepreneurial, but rather horizontal, market entry. As a result, the
political conflicts between the technologists and the incumbent
copyright disseminators have, in general, made for a fairer fight.
The second stream of new law emerges from a legislative process
that pits organized incumbents against infringing users. The results
may constitute the institutional change with the longest lasting effects
for copyright law as a whole. As I have written elsewhere, the
copyright law long relied on a gatekeeper system for its enforcement:
the targeting of specialized intermediaries.300 Until recently,
enforcement against normal, non-commercial individuals was
extremely rare, and effectively not a part of copyright. As the
Technology Assessment Office wrote in the 1989, "[a]ll U.S. copyright
law, including the Copyright Act of 1976, proceeds on the assumption
that effective and efficient copying is a large-scale, publicly visible,
commercial activity."301 That has changed, and the conflict between
incumbent disseminators and infringing users is open and obvious.
The political economy of this conflict could not be any more different
from that with the technologists. It is a conflict between organized
industry groups and scattered individuals. As basic public choice
theory would suggest, the legislative results are largely dictated by the
organized, copyright-owning industries.
The incumbent-user conflict has begat new laws regulating
individual infringers, including the No Electronic Theft Act,302 the
300. See Wu, supra note 45, at 685-86 (describing the evolution of copyright's
enforcement system).
301. Office of Tech. Assessment, U.S. Cong., Copyright and Home Copying:
Technology Challenges the Law 11 (Oct. 1989).
302. Pub. L. No. 105-147, 1 1 1 Stat. 2678 (1997) [hereinafter NET Act].
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anti-bootlegging law (17 U.S.C. § 1101), the anti-circumvention
portions of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (17 U.S.C. § 1201 et
seq) , and section 1008 of the Audio Digital Home Recording Act.
Whether for good or for ill, these measures are hard to describe as
settlements negotiated between incumbent industries and users as a
group. In addition, the tension between disseminators and infringing
users has led to some of the first lawsuits filed against "recreational"
infringers in the history of copyright.
With this new model in mind, we now turn to examining some of
the most important episodes that have created copyright's new
communications policy.
1.

The Technologists

In 1971, Congress commented that copyright was never meant to
"restrain the home recording, from broadcasts or from tapes or
records, of recorded performances."303 That widespread assumption that home copying was no threat to copyright-dependent industries changed forever in November of 1975.
That was the month Sony Japan began selling its first consumer
version of the "Video Tape Recorder." Selling for the suggested retail
price of $2295, the floor model LV-1901 Betamax combined a
nineteen-inch color television with a VCR capable of storing a full
hour of television programming on a single cassette. The
advertisement that launched the VCR conflict ran as follows:
NOW YOU DON'T HAVE TO MISS KOJAK BECAUSE YOU'RE
WATCHING COLUMBO (OR VICE VERSA)/BETAMAX - IT'S A
SONY304

With this advertisement, "time-shifting," or recording programs to
watch later, entered the public imagination. But the film industry was
not impressed. Within a year, on November 11, 1976, Universal
Studios and Walt Disney filed complaints of copyright infringement.305
Some of the familiar patterns of copyright conflict were evident.
Sony and other electronics manufacturers were offering a new and
better way to watch broadcast content. Part of their market advantage,
of course, came from not having to pay anything for copyright licenses
to films and television programs. Yet there was one important
difference between Sony and the challengers that came before it. As
opposed to actively disseminating copyrighted works itself, Sony
merely provided a technology that gave users the capacity to access

303. H.R. REP. No. 92-487, at 7 (1971).
304. Reprinted in JAMES LARDNER, FAST FORWARD: HOLLYWOOD, THE JAPANESE,
AND THE ONSLAUGHT OF THE VCR 21 (1987).
305. Id. at 34.
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copyrighted works in new ways, and without paying royalties. This
more passive role would ultimately work to Sony's advantage in court.
Meanwhile, the movie studios' principal interest was, as in previous
conflicts, seeking some means of control: either to stop the VCR or
obtain a portion of its sales revenue in royalties. Both sides, as usual,
went to the federal government to plead their case.
Jack Valenti stated the film industry's case in congressional
hearings. The VCR, he opined, is "advertised for one purpose in
life . . . . to copy copyrighted material that belongs to other people."306
But, Mr. Valenti warned:
Nothing of value is free. It is very easy, Mr. Chairman, to convince the
people that it is in their best interest to give away somebody else's
property for nothing, but even the most guileless among us know that
this is a cave of illusion where commonsense is lured and then quietly
strangled.307

In addition to blaming Japanese VCRs for the American trade
deficit, Valenti expressed a candid view of copyright as a form of
protection for the film industry:
[W]e are facing a very new and a very troubling assault on our fiscal
security, on our very economic life and we are facing it from a thing
called the video cassette recorder and its necessary companion called the
blank tape. And it is like a great tidal wave just off the shore. This video
cassette recorder and the blank tape threaten profoundly the life
sustaining protection, I guess you would call it, on which copyright
owners depend, on which film people depend, on which television people
depend and it is called copyright.308

As Valenti concluded, in what has become his most famous quote,
"I say to you that the VCR is to the American film producer and the
American public as the Boston strangler is to the woman home
alone."
By 1 981, the film industry had convinced the Ninth Circuit to hold
Sony liable for contributing to the copyright infringement of home
viewers.309 That court found that the videotape recorder had no
purpose other than to infringe: it was "manufactured, advertised, and
sold for the primary purpose of reproducing [copyrighted] television
programming. "310 Since the court could find no exception in the
306. Home Recording of Copyrighted Works: Hearings on H.R. 4783, H.R. 4794, H.R.
4808, H.R. 5250, H.R. 5488, and H.R. 5705 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties,
and the Administration of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong, 2d Sess. 5
(1982) [hereinafter VCR Hearings) (statement of Jack Valenti, President, Motion Picture
Association of America).
307. VCR Hearings, supra note 306.
308. VCR Hearings, supra note 306, at 4, 8.
309. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of Am., 659 F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1981).
310. Id. at 975.
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copyright code for personal or home copying, Sony was infringing.
The court suggested either placing a permanent injunction on the sale
of the VCR or setting up a royalty scheme, i.e., a judicial version of a
compulsory license.
Within twenty-four hours of the decision, both sides went to
Congress with different proposals. The electronics industry wanted a
full exemption from copyright liability for home video recording.311
The film industry counteroffered with an exemption tied to a royalty
scheme for the film and television industries.312 It seemed that the
VCR matter would follow the pattern of the classic communications
regime, and end in a congressionally implemented settlement.
But the Supreme Court upstaged Congress with its first major
copyright communications policy case since Fortnightly. In Sony the
Court sided with the electronics industry, delivering the exemption
from copyright they were seeking in Congress. The Court did so by
holding that the VCR would be exempt from contributory or vicarious
copyright liability provided that its technologies were, in fact,
technologies of general or broad purpose.313 As Justice Stevens stated
in his oft-cited Sony rule, "the sale of copying equipment, like the sale
of other articles of commerce, does not constitute contributory
infringement if the product is widely used for legitimate,
unobjectionable purposes."314 To put the matter further: "Indeed, [the
technology] need merely be capable of substantial noninfringing
uses."315
Even by some of its former critics, Sony is acclaimed if not for its
analysis, for its foresight. As Edward Samuels, a skeptic at the time,
writes, "the VCR turned out to be one of the most lucrative inventions
- for movie producers as well as hardware manufacturers - since
movie projectors."316 Unlike
the
other major copyright
communications cases, Sony did not lead to the formal establishment
of a liability regime. As detailed by James Lardner, the film industry
slowly began to take a softer line after the Court's ruling. The industry
itself concluded that "squelching" the VCR was not necessarily in its

311. See S. 175, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REC. 851 (1983); see also H.R. 5250,
97th Cong., 128 CONG. REC. 9863 (1982); H.R. 4783, 97th Cong. (1981).
312. See S. 31, 98th Cong. (1983); H.R. 1030, 98th Cong. (1983); H.R. 5705, 97th Cong.
(1982).
313. The Court also ruled time-shifting a "fair use." See Sony Corp. of America v.
Universal Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 442 (1984) ("[T]he unauthorized home time-shifting of
respondents' programs is legitimate fair use.").
314. Id.
315. Id.
316. SAMUELS, supra note 92, at 70.
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interest.317 This judgment was correct: in time the VCR became a
major source of revenue for the film and broadcast industries.318
The Sony decision will always be open to the criticism that the
Court could have done more to differentiate between VCRs that
record and VCRs that simply play pre-recorded videos. But as a
pragmatic matter, one reason Sony may have succeeded is that it self
consciously abandoned a simple authorship analysis when faced with
the use of copyright by an incumbent industry to control or block
legitimate technological rivals.319 The Sony rule can be understood as a
rule to help a court distinguish between problems of authorship and
the more difficult problems of competition among disseminators. The
fact that a new communications technology can be used for
"legitimate, unobjectionable purposes" establishes that the court is
faced with a market entrant, as opposed to mere evasion of the
copyright statute. Therefore the court knows that it faces a problem of
regulating competition among rivals, and acts accordingly. Conversely,
if the technology in question is used to infringe, the court is faced with
a problem where protecting authorship incentives predominates. This
division is suggested by the Court's statement that " [s]ound policy, as
well as history, supports our consistent deference to Congress when
major technological innovations alter the market for copyrighted
materials. Congress has the constitutional authority and the
institutional ability to accommodate fully the varied permutations of
competing interests that are inevitably implicated by such new
technology. "320
There is an important difference between the Sony rule and the
unanchored "free pass" for new technologies found in cases like
Teleprompter. Sony forces federal courts to pass judgment on new
technologies, to act as a kind of technological gatekeeper. The courts
must make some assessment of whether, on balance, the likely harm
created by the subject technology - most obviously, through damage
to creation incentives - actually makes market entry desirable. The
Sony rule therefore requires courts to develop some concept of
"legitimate" technology that constitutes a bona fide market entrant.
Its suggestion is very open-ended: being "capable of substantial non
infringing uses" is good enough.
The Sony rule puts courts in an odd position, for they must rely on
their instincts and the limited evidence before them to decide whether
a new technology seems legitimate. The fact that so many now-

317. LARDNER, supra note 304, at 284.
318. See id. at 325-28 (detailing how videocassette revenue grew to equal that of ticket
revenue).
319. See Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
320. See id. at 431 .

November 2004]

Copyright's Communications Policy

349

mainstream communications technologies were born as pirates further
complicates matters. These limits of judicial competence might suggest
a lenient reading of the Sony rule, but some have come to the opposite
conclusion. Randy Picker sees Sony as a rule of entry that is too
lenient. In his view, the Sony rule by its own logic allows harmful
market entry: it would allow market entry of a product that had $100
of legitimate use, but causes a $1000 harm through loss of creation
incentives. Allowing such a product to be on the market is therefore,
according to Picker, a bad result.
But there are good responses to Picker's argument which support a
lenient market entry rule for new communications technologies. The
first is institutional. If a court using the Sony rule gets it wrong and
allows technological market entry that turns out to be harmful,
Congress can later reverse the determination. Indeed, had the Sony
decision led to the near-collapse of the film industry, surely a
congressional remedy would have been forthcoming. Conversely,
court suppression of a new technology is, for all intents and purposes,
congressionally irreversible. A new technologist almost by definition
has little chance of convincing Congress to reverse a copyright
holding.
Second, Picker's view may put too much faith in the courts to act
as accurate gatekeepers of market entry. It is certainly beyond the
ability of a court, or indeed anyone, to accurately predict the future
social benefit of a new technology - such are the teachings of
evolutionary innovation theory.321 To compare the future benefit to
the present and future harm introduces still greater chances for error.
For one thing judges might, like other governmental actors,
consistently overrate present and visible harms.322 Picker does
acknowledge that the assessment of benefit should include the
possibility that the technology will turn out to be much more socially
beneficial than originally imagined, but he does not develop the point
further.323
Innovation theory teaches that predicting the evolution of
technology is difficult, making it important to let the market assess the
potential of any new technology, whether a mousetrap, molecule, or
copying device. This suggests that the government should ban a new
technology only if the harm of allowing the technology to reach the
market very clearly outweighs the benefits. These are not
321. See supra Part II.B.
322. Cf Anne 0. Krueger, Asymmetries in Policy Between Exportables and Import
Competing Goods, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 161 (Ronald
W. Jones & Anne 0. Krueger eds., 1990) (discussing "identity bias," or the tendency of
government actors to act to protect the identifiable tragedy of lost jobs instead of diverting
rents to the creation of new jobs).
323. Picker, supra note 22.
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controversial sentiments outside of the copyright debate. Government
only very rarely reaches out to ban technological developments that
might be harmful, even those that distress people like genetic
engineering. In copyright, the equivalent policy is the lenient version
of the Sony rule. It asks judges to filter clearly illegitimate
technological uses, such as those that could not survive but for the
advantage of piracy. It leaves the rest to the market and Congress if
the court is terribly wrong. This formulation of the Sony rule might
occasionally lead to dramatic results, but creative destruction is not a
dinner party.
Whether Sony is too lenient or too strict a rule of market entry
remains an open question.324 But the case's institutional significance
for copyright's communications policy cannot be doubted. Sony set
the precedent for settling technological rivalry problems with
judicially-balanced immunity rules. It is the foundation and
centerpiece of copyright's new communications policy.
2.

Internet Service Providers

By the early-1990s it was already clear that a new technology and a
new industry benefited from copyright infringement and represented a
threat to traditional disseminators. That new technology was the
Internet, and the benefiting industry was the Internet Service
Providers.
The response to this threat was not modest. As the Internet
became mainstream, the incumbent disseminators proposed a
sweeping set of copyright reforms. Most were adopted as Clinton
administration policy by the Commerce Department, and published as
the 1 995 Report on Intellectual Property and the National Information
Infrastructure, better known as the "White Paper. "325 In retrospect, the
publication of the White Paper was the opening shot in what became a
grand legislative battle between traditional copyright disseminators
and their internet challengers.
The White Paper adopted the position that the greatest potential
of the Internet depended on expanded copyright protection. "The full
potential of the NII," it said "will not be realized if the education,
information and entertainment products protected by intellectual
property laws are not protected effectively when disseminated via the
Nil."326 For copyright purposes, the White Paper's implementation
324. For another view of what the Sony rule should be, see Glenn Lunney Jr., Fair Use
and Market Failure: Sony Revisited, 82 B.U. L. REV. 975, 977 (2002).
325. Commerce Department, Intellectual Property and the National Information
Infrastructure: Report of the Working Group on Intellectual Property Rights (1995)
[hereinafter White Paper].
326. Id. at 10.
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contemplated two major sets of changes: one targeted at infringing
users, and another at ISPs. In short, White Paper targeted the two
groups who posed a challenge to existing models of dissemination.
The first group of important proposals consisted of two new "anti
piracy" reforms. The White Paper argued that "current law is
insufficient to prevent flagrant copyright violations" in the Internet
context.327 It proposed expanding the criminal side of copyright to
make non-profit, or "recreational piracy" of copyrighted works
criminal.328 The second proposal was also directed at individual
pirates, aiming to stop copy-protection systems, or "digital locks,"
from being circumvented. As the White Paper argued, "technological
protection likely will not be effective unless the law also provides
some protection for the technological processes and systems used to
prevent or restrict unauthorized uses of copyrighted works."329 It
proposed more criminal liability, and also liability for traffickers of
protection-breaking technologies. We'll come back to both these
proposals later.
The second major proposed reform was a clear recognition of
"transmission," including digital transmission, as a form of
"reproduction," or copying under the copyright statute. The White
Paper took the position that this would merely reaffirm established
law, but that position was slightly misleading. The liability of ISPs for
copyright infringement occurring on their networks was, at the time,
still an open question.330 The White Paper argued in favor: "Service
providers reap rewards for infringing activity. It is difficult to argue
that they should not bear the responsibilities."331 Since ISPs are "in a
better position to prevent or stop infringement than the copyright
owner," the White Paper concluded, "the best policy is to hold the
service provider liable. "332
To this conclusion the service provider industry took great
exception. From their view, the White Paper's proposals had the
potential to put the industry on the hook for a massive volume of
copyright infringement practiced via the Internet, and in least in
theory, billions in statutory damages. As the White Paper proposals
quickly became bills in the House and Senate, the threat woke up the
ISP industry and the power of its lobby. This must be understood
clearly: the ISP industry, while in parts new, also included many

327. Id. at 127.
328. Id. at 228-29.
329. Id. at 230.
330. Among others, the Netcom decision, discussed infra text accompanying notes 340342, took the different position.
331. White Paper, supra note 325, at 117.
332. Id.
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powerful telecommunications companies like Bell Atlantic and
AT&T,
long-term
players
with
deep
experience
with
telecommunications regulation. These companies ordered their
lobbyist armies in Washington to fight the copyright threat both in the
capital and in Geneva. Bruce Lehman, then Patent and Trademark
Commissioner, characterized matters well: "You've got two gigantic,
very powerful industries in Washington: the telephone companies and
the computer industry on one side, the content industries, the record
companies, the movie industry on the other."333 He predicted that
"they won't make a deal with each other until they start counting
votes in Congress." He was right.
In an early victory for the ISP industry, neither 1995 bill made it
out of committee, despite Jack Valenti's warning that without
congressional action, "the information superhighway . . . will collapse
the great wonder of intellectual property."334 The Commerce
Department, however, took the substance of its proposals to Geneva.
That's where the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO)
was working on "digital-era" amendments to the Berne Convention,
the world's principal copyright treaty. The strategy - mostly
successful - was to join with European allies to negotiate a treaty
comprising much of the substance contained in the 1995 Act, as part of
the effort to bring the law back to Washington as a treaty
implementing measure.
In December 1996 WIPO convened its diplomatic conference in
Geneva to consider several new copyright treaties. While nominally a
meeting of nation-states, domestic lobbyists of all stripes were in
attendance, including American representatives from both the
traditional disseminators and ISP industries. Much lobbying effort
centered on Article 7(1) of the draft WIPO Copyright Treaty, which
was a replica of the White Paper's "transmission" proposal.335 It stated
that the "right of reproduction" shall include "direct or indirect
reproduction . . . whether permanent or temporary, in any manner or
form." The draft treaty also created an exception for "transient or
incident" reproduction, Article 7(2), designed to favor ISPs.336 But the
ISP industry, rightly or wrongly, felt that the broad language of 7(1)
was dangerously close to strict liability for all temporary copies of

333. Seth Schiesel, Copyright Treaties Still Have Opponents in Congress, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 1, 1997.
334. NII Copyright Protection Act of 1995, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on
Courts and Intellectual Property, 105th Cong. (1996) (testimony of Jack Valenti).
335. Basic Proposal for the Substantive Provisions of the Treaty on Certain Questions
Concerning the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works to Be Considered by the
Diplomatic Conference on Certain Copyright and Neighboring Rights Questions, Art. 7(1)
WIPO Doc. CRNR/D04 (Aug. 30, 1996) [hereinafter WIPO Draft Copyright Treaty].
336. Id. Art. 7(2).
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works passing through their networks. Some Internet carriers
analogized themselves to the Postal Service: "Just like the postal
service cannot (and indeed should not) monitor the contents of all the
envelopes it handles, it is simply not possible for an infrastructure
provider to monitor whether the millions of electronic messages it
transmits daily have been authorized."337
To the surprise of some observers, close to the end of negotiations,
Article 7 was deleted from the WIPO Treaty in its entirety. While
explanations for the deletion vary, both the ISPs and entertainment
industries claimed victory.338 Meanwhile, the rest of the White Paper
proposals survived, including, most-importantly to the copyright
owners, the central anti-circumvention proposal. The legislative fight
returned to Washington. Said Larry Clinton, a Bell lobbyist, " [t]his
battle has been going on for a year from our point of view, so it's
continuing - not brewing."339
As the White Paper and Geneva processes played out, the
j udiciary entered the picture, deciding several important cases in the
Ninth Circuit. As in other copyright conflicts, the decisions mostly
strengthened the hand of challengers (the ISPs) and above all changed
the baselines for negotiation. The most politically important case was
Religious Technology Center. v. Netcom On-Line Communication
Services.340 Netcom was the first true ISP liability case, and to the
delight of the ISP industry, the district court rejected a rule of direct
liability for the ISP. Said the court, "it does not make sense to adopt a
rule that could lead to the liability of countless parties whose role in
the infringement is nothing more than setting up and operating a
system that is necessary for the functioning of the Internet."341 The
Netcom court did, however, find that liability was possible on what
became known as a "notice-and-take-down" theory. It held that actual
notice of a user's infringing actions could create a duty on the part of
the ISP to take preventive measures (a "take-down"), else
contributory copyright liability.
The Netcom rule was not, of course, the full immunity that the ISP
industry might have preferred. And it was also only a district court

337. Ad Hoc Alliance for a Digital Future, Suggested Revisions to the Chairman's Basic
Proposal for the Treaty Formerly Known as the Berne Protocol 2, (Oct. 31, 1996).
338. See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson, The U.S. Digital Agenda at WIPO, 37 VA. J. INT'L L.
369, 391-92 (discussing how both sides claimed victory from the deletion of Article 7, but
noting "it is significant that the copyright treaty signed in Geneva does not include a
provision on temporary copying given how intent the U.S. and E.U. delegations had been
about getting such a treaty provision").
339. Seth Schiesel, Copyright Treaties Still Have Opponents in Congress, N.Y. DMES,
Jan. 1, 1997.
340. 907 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
341. Id. at 1372.
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decision.342 But Netcom's rejection of direct liability contradicted the
White Paper's assumption that ISPs would be directly liable. It also
granted substantially more protection than the levels of liability sought
by the traditional incumbents and proposed by the WIPO Draft
Treaty. Preserving the protections of Netcom became an industry
mantra.
Meanwhile, back in Washington, the slow-motion legislative
struggle continued. To strengthen their hand, the ISPs turned to their
champion, Senator John Ashcroft, who proposed legislation that
would have come close to completely immunizing the ISP industry
from secondary copyright liability.343 In the summer of 1997 the
Commerce Department finally sent over its legislation for
implementing the WIPO treaty, including the controversial anti
circumvention rules.344 And in search of compromise, Representative
Coble introduced what the ISPs wanted: an On-Line Copyright
Liability Limitation Act, H.R. 2180.345
At this point the legislative calculus put ISPs and traditional
copyright owners in a slightly complex standoff. The copyright owners
most of all wanted treaty-ratification and implementation of most of
all the anti-circumvention measures they had fought for in the WIPO
Copyright Treaty and the White Paper.346 While their preference for
ISPs was still strict liability, it was by now clear that such prospects
were dim. They bet, instead, that Netcom would not last, and that the
courts would ultimately deliver ISP liability. The ISPs had good reason
to fear that Netcom might be an aberration, and wanted, more than
anything, to codify that decision in strong liability-limiting legislation.
Their bargaining chip was enough influence over key members of
Congress to block the anti-circumvention rules unless the copyright
owners agreed to their liability limits. Finally, for both ISPs and
copyright owners there were dangers waiting. The ISPs risked the
erosion of their Netcom position through ongoing litigation. And for
copyright owners the entire investment in the White Paper I WIPO
process was in jeopardy.

342. In fact, the Ninth Circuit began backing away from Netcom in Fonovisa, Inc. v.
Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259 (9th Cir. 1996).
343. Digital Copyright Clarification and Technology Education Act of 1997, S. 1 146,
105th Cong. (1997). The companion bill in the House, the Digital Era Copyright
Enhancement Act, H.R. 3048, was co-sponsored by Reps. Boucher (D-VA) and Campbell
(R-CA).
344. H.R. 2281, 105th Cong. (1996).
345. H.R. 2180, 105th Cong. (1997).
346. The recording industry also wanted various protections stemming from a second
WIPO Treaty, the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty, adopted Dec. 20, 1996,
WIPO Doc. CRNR/DC/95.
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New Congressional hearings came in September of 1997, where the
telecommunications and entertainment industries went head-to
head.347 Jack Valenti from the film industry used his time to attack the
ISP's liability-limitation bill, calling it an effort to "weaken" copyright.
Passing the bill, he said, would create "a clear and present danger,
inviting the slow undoing of America's most precious trade asset, its
native-born intellectual property."348 Hilary Rosen, President of the
RIAA, was more aggressive. She accused the telecommunications
industry of holding "hostage" the treaty process, stating, "I urge you
not to let the "Online Service Provider" debate . . . slow deliberation
on this issue when swift U.S. Congressional action is so important to
U.S. economic interests around the globe." Following tradition, the
recording industry brought an artist, this time country singer Johnny
Cash, to speak on the evils of piracy. But things did not go exactly as
planned: Cash departed from his prepared text, blurting out that he'd
actually sold his foreign copyrights years ago.349
Roy Neel, a close friend of Vice President Al Gore, testified on
behalf of the powerful Bell Companies. A week earlier, he had made
it clear in Senate testimony that the Bells would block any Treaty
implementation bill that lacked a provision limiting ISP liability.350 In
the House, Neel advocated as much immunity as possible, charging
that "copyright law threatens to put a damper on the expression of
ideas on the Internet." He also accused the entertainment industries of
trying to sue ISPs out of existence. " [W]hile [the Telecom Industry is]
committed to the Internet, the threat of copyright lawsuits is becoming
an increasingly salient consideration in offering the service at all."
(For his part, Representative Barney Frank commented "I have never
encountered so many people who seem to me to be well off and doing
quite well feeling so victimized.")351
Settlement came in the Spring. A joint bill, now named the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) was introduced on April 1 , 1998.
The new bill represented a deal between the ISPs and traditional
copyright owners that merged their principal interests. The anti
circumvention laws became Title I of the Act, while the On-Line
Copyright Liability Limitation Act became Title IL This left only user
groups to deal with, many of whom, joined by the occasional copyright
professor, argued that the law would erode fair-use rights. Professor
347. The WIPO Copyright Treaties Implementation Act and Online Copyright Liability
Limitation Act, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Courts and Intellectual Property,
105th Cong. (1997).
348. Id. (statement of Jack Valenti).
349. See Courtney Macavinta, Johnny Cash sings copyright blues, CNET, Sept. 17, 1997,
at http:/lnews.com.com/2100-1023-203367.html?legacy=cnet (last visited Dec. 20, 2004).
350. See 1997 Hearings (statement of Hilary Rosen).
351 . 1997 Hearings at 279 (statement of Rep. Frank).
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Peter Jaszi, for example, argued that the law "would effectively gut
fair use by giving copyright owners broad new authority to block what
are now lawful acts."352 But as public choice theory might predict, user
groups lacked the power to stop Title I. Instead, various legitimate
user-groups (like libraries) were granted specific exceptions, along
with the possibility for more down the line, creating a legislative
product of extraordinary complexity. After several more months of
wrangling for exceptions, President Clinton signed the entire Act into
law on October 28, 1998. He remarked, without irony, that the Act
"reflects the diligence and talents of a great many people."353
The final compromise on ISP liability was codified as 17 U.S.C.
section 512. This is not the place for a full description of section 512
and its complexities. But the law is notable for using a highly
characteristic device for managing copyright's relationships: statutory
safe harbors.354 Technologists, unlike the challengers of the "classic"
period, do not need access to copyrighted works to make money, and
do not bargain for compulsory licenses. Instead, they seek statutory
versions of the Sony rule: provisions that establish under what
conditions a given technology will be free from copyright liability. In
the case of section 512, the end result was rather close to the
codification of the Netcom rule that the ISPs sought.
It is true that section 512 has created some problems and certainly
some unexpected consequences. Depending on what you take as your
baseline, it is also true that section 512 has either increased the costs of
business for service providers or made copyright infringement more
difficult to police. But like many of the copyright settlements
described here, the rule's accomplishment is the reduction of some
uncertainty as between the parties. For better or for worse, section 512
must be taken as the definitive example of copyright's new
communications policy in action.
C.

Toward Greater Control of End- Users

As copyright's new communications policy has developed, the
change with perhaps the greatest long-term consequences the effort to
change the relationship between disseminators and users. For the first
time, consumers themselves (at least some of them) have formed part
of the threat to the market position of the incumbents. As a result,

352. Hearing On The World Intellectual Property Organization Copyright Treaty and
World Intellectual Property Organization Performances And Phonograrns Treaty, Sept. 10,
1998 (Statement of Peter Jaszi).
353. Statement by President William J. Clinton, October 28, 1998.
354. The use of statutory safe harbors was pioneered in the negotiations over the Digital
Audio Tape, which eventually led to the Audio Home Recording Act of 1992, Pub. L. No.
102-563, 106 Stat. 4237.
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laws have been enacted that for the first time clearly and explicitly
govern user behavior. In addition, users, as opposed to specialized
intermediaries, have been sued for violating the law of copyright.
In the 1990s, an unofficial "anti-piracy" code was added to the
copyright law through three amendments: the No Electronic Theft
("NET")Act, the Anti-bootlegging law, 17 U.S.C. § 1101, and Title I
of the DMCA, the anti-circumvention law provisions, whose
enactment was just discussed. We look here at two of those
amendments.
1.

The No Electronic Theft Act

In 1993, David LaMacchia was a 20-year-old student at the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology and also the operator of a
pirate bulletin board system named " Cynosure." His board made
available free copies of expensive commercial software programs like
Excel, WordPerfect and Simcity.355
Unfortunately for LaMacchia, word got out and one day he was
arrested. Boston's U.S. Attorney, Donald Stern, announced the arrest,
stressing the economic costs of software piracy. "The pirating of
business and entertainment software through clandestine computer
bulletin boards is tremendously costly to software companies, and by
extension, the economy."356
But LaMacchia was a different kind of copyright infringer than the
criminal provisions of the copyright code had contemplated. He was
what is called a "recreational pirate": he earned no money from his
enterprise, nor anything that might be termed a "commercial
advantage." As of 1994 criminal copyright punished only infringement
"for purposes of commercial advantage or private financial gain. "357
LaMacchia's free bulletin board satisfied neither element. He was, as
this Article has described, the perfect example of a "user" infringer.
He disseminated copyrighted works for fun and a kind of glory.
These facts, however, made him no less of a threat to the software
industry's business model. LaMacchia was not, of course, a direct
competitor to software companies as a creator of software. But he was,
in effect, a rival disseminator. And just like many challengers
considered in this Article, LaMacchia was a disseminator not covered
by the Copyright statute. The federal district court quickly dismissed
his prosecution, and in 1994, David LaMacchia went free.358

355. See U.S v. LaMacchia, 871 F. Supp. 535, (D. Mass. 1994).
356. Ralph Ranalli, Student Nabbed in Computer Fraud Case, BOSTON HERALD, Apr. 8,
1994, p. 33.
357. 17 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1994).
358. See LaMacchia, 871 F.Supp. at 535.
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Recreational piracy like LaMacchia's was criminalized in 1997. As
discussed above, the 1995 White Paper proposed a legislative response
to the LaMacchia case, and it came in 1997, as the No Electronic Theft
Act. The NET Act eliminated the requirement of commercial profit
that had been a part of the law since 1897.359 First, "financial gain"
would be defined to include "receipt, or expectation of receipt, of
anything of value, including the receipt of other copyrighted works."360
This language would make private, quid-pro-quo trading of copyright
works a criminal offense. Second, the Act added that infringement of
more than $1000 worth of copyright works within a 180 day period
would constitute criminal copyright infringement.361 While this
language would not cover one-time, casual infringement, it would
cover anyone who, for example, used a substantial amount of
infringing software on their computer.
Unsurprisingly, the NET Act did not encounter substantial
legislative resistance. Framed by its sponsors as a law meant to close a
loophole in the copyright law, it passed the House by a voice vote, and
passed the Senate unanimously. The contrast with the DMCA
enactment process, or indeed any of the conflicts considered in this
Article, could not be starker. There were no protracted negotiations
or battles, nor a struggle between the software industry and a putative
"National Association of Pirate Bulletin Boards." In Congressional
hearings held a week before the contentious WIPO Implementation
hearings, not a single witness testified against the Act.362 Both the
interest in a NET Act and the relative ease with which it was passed
show how the political economy of copyright amendment has changed.
Since its enactment in 1997, the NET Act has been used to
prosecute slightly over 80 people, all for non-profit "sharing" of
copyrighted works.363 The Justice Department has yet to lose a case.
Of those sentenced to prison, the average length is approximately 25.7
months; the longest jail sentence was forty-six months and the shortest
was four months.364 Robin Rothberg represents a typical software
prosecution. The 34-year-old Boston-area computer consultant was
convicted as the leader of "Pirates With Attitude," an online software
piracy group.365 He was sentenced 18 months in federal prison. The

359. Act of January 6, 1897, ch. 4, 29 Stat. 481-482.
360. NET Act, supra note 302, § 2(a).
361. Id.
362. See "No Electronic Theft (Net) Act," Hearing on H.R. 2265, 105th Cong., (1997).
363. Eric Goldman, Warez Trading and Criminal Copyright Infringement, 51 J.
COPYRIGHT SOC'Y U.S.A. 395, 427 (2004).
364. Id. at 412.
365. Lee Gomes, Software Pirates Face Brig Time, Angering Critics, WALL ST. J., Mar.
21, 2002, at Bl.

November 2004]

Copyright's Communications Policy

359

first film infringement prosecution came in 2000, when 25-year-old
Jason Spatafore was charged with criminally infringing copyright in
the film "Star Wars: The Phantom Menance."366 Spatafore was
indicted after uploading portions of the Star Wars prequel to various
web sites and encouraging others to download it.
The point here is not to debate the merits of the NET Act. The
point is to show how the potential for users to act as rival
disseminators has led to a growth of copyright's direct regulation of
end users. That is a change copyright's communications regime, and
one with potentially long-lasting consequences for the nature of
copyright itself.
2.

The Anti-Circumvention Provisions of the DMCA

The anti-circumvention provisions of the DMCA (codified in 17
U.S.C. § 1201 et seq) have been understood in many different ways by
different people. The law and its effects (intended and otherwise) are
too complicated to give full treatment here. The only point of
relevance is that the anti-circumvention rules are perhaps best
understood as a legislative byproduct of the conflict between
disseminators and consumers in the 1990s. As Peter Menell writes,
"analogous concerns" lay behind the anti-circumvention law and the
NET Act: the suppression of "digital piracy."367
Unlike many of the other amendments studied in this Article, the
anti-circumvention rules do not target an industry rival or
technological challenger. They do not fit the pattern of, for example,
the broadcasters' efforts against cable, ASCAP's efforts to derive
revenue from radio, or the proposed royalty scheme for the VCR.
Instead, the point of the anti-circumvention laws was to supplement
technological efforts (digital locks) to make home copying more
expensive if not impossible. Considered as a package with encryption
initiatives, it becomes clear that the goal was eliminating the threat
from infringing consumers acting as rival disseminators.
In 1995, when the anti-circumvention rules were first placed before
Congress, Jack Valenti argued powerfully that the goal of anti
circumvention laws was to fight piracy, and as such any law must
include criminal punishments. "One key weapon in our anti-piracy
arsenal," he said, "is technology itself: electronic locks of various kinds
that seek to prevent high-tech burglars from breaking, entering, and

366. Scott Craven, 'Phantom Menace' Case May Test Laws, THE ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Sept.
22, 2000, at lB.
367. Peter S. Menell, Envisioning Copyright Law's Digital Future, 46 N.Y.L. SCH. L.
REV. 63, 133 (2002-03).
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plundering our intellectual property."368 For anti-circumvention laws
to work, he said "Criminal sanctions are essential. Too many NII
bandits, some operating totally in the underground economy, will scoff
at the threat of civil damages, which many regard as simply a cost of
doing business. "369 The emphasis on criminal liability is consistent with
efforts, like the NET Act discussed above, to regulate infringing users,
and not just large intermediaries.
Understanding the anti-circumvention laws as part of an anti
piracy campaign helps explain the very odd structure of the exceptions
found in section 1201. As discussed above, unlike many of the other
conflicts studied here, and unlike section 512 as a direct comparison,
there was no direct conflict between industries that led to the anti
circumvention laws. There was no "circumvention" industry
demanding a safe harbor or compulsory licensing scheme. Instead, the
prohibitions in section 1201 includes particularized and confusing
exceptions for certain types of users: libraries, law enforcement and
government users, the software industry, and encryption
researchers.370 It also creates the possibility for other exceptions by
stating that it preserves fair use and creating a rule-making process for
other exceptions conducted by the Library of Congress.371 These
exceptions are obvious accommodations to user groups who happened
to be party to the legislative process. But it must again be stressed how
different the result is as compared with the process of copyright
settlement between rival industries. A represented industry does not
ask for the preservation of "fair use"; it demands an exception written
for itself. Section 1201 of the DMCA and the confusion that surrounds
it are, in other words, a result attributable to the unusual political
economy surrounding copyright in the 1990s and persisting today.
D.

The War Over Online Distribution

In the 2000s, it is difficult to pick up a newspaper or magazine
without seeing something about an ongoing "war" between the
entertainment industry (Los Angeles) and computer programmers
(San Francisco). Some of the excitement and rhetoric have masked the
basic questions of communications policy presented.
What is termed the California civil war reveals the patterns of
conflict between challenger and incumbent dissemination industries
described here. The incumbent, the existing recording industry, relies

368. NII Copyright Protection Act of 1995: Hearing before Subcommittee on Courts
and Intellectual Property, 104th Cong. (1997).
369. Id.
370. See V.S.C. § 1201(d)-(g).
371. See V.S.C. § 1201(a)(l)(C).
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on "fixed" distribution: distribution of content fixed in CDs, DVDs or
books, sold in retail stores. The challenger is the team effort described
above: an (intentionally) passive online technologist coupled with
highly active infringing users. As between online and retail
distribution, neither from first principles has the obvious upper hand.
Online distribution does eliminate many overhead costs (e.g., retail
stores) and should be cheaper; it also provides customers the ability to
get copyrighted content without actually going to a store. But fixed
media has the advantage of the fixed form, packaging, and in some
cases a superior product (real books are beautiful, very portable, and
operate without batteries). Were neutral conditions of competition to
apply, it might be a fair fight. But fair fights have never been a feature
of the history of new communications technologies. We must look to
see how copyright sets the stage for competition between incumbent
and challenger.
Like their predecessors, certain online distributors have taken
advantage of copyright "piracy" to gain an advantage over the
incumbent. This was a particularly salient issue with respect to music,
and the ability to appropriate copyrighted material was behind the
growth of well-known companies like Napster and KaZaA. To repeat
a point made earlier, the structure of the 1976 Act makes trying to rely
on the ambiguity of the copyright statute (like the recording industry
in 1909 or cable in the 1950s) a dicey proposition.372 Instead, the
historical infrequency and high cost of end-user enforcement were the
vulnerabilities exploited by programmers.373 It is important to
understand that pure "peer-to-peer" filesharing programs are not
necessarily the best systems of online distribution. Their popularity
and comparative advantage lies in the fact that they are designed to
evade copyright's enforcement system, and therefore minimize the
price of an essential input (copyrighted materials).374
Meanwhile, the incumbent recording industry, like some of its
predecessors, has done just what it can to gain control over the
challengers. What is distinctive about these efforts is the extent to
which they target both the challenger disseminators and its users. The
full extent of their efforts has been detailed elsewhere: it includes
entirely new strategies of enforcement, such as the dramatic targeting

372. Early companies that tried to do so lost nearly immediately. My MP3.com was an
early online distributor that tried to "go legit" by licensing music and allowing people to
download music that they already owned on CD. It was, however, quickly shut down despite
their protestations of fair use. See UMG Recordings v. MP3.com, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 349
(S.D.N.Y. 2000).
373. See Wu, supra note 45, at 711-16 (describing copyright's gatekeeper system).
374. See id. at 731-37 (describing the evolution of programs around the problem of
copyright liability).
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of end-users,375 investments in extralegal remedies,376 and demands
that the Justice Department use criminal sanctions.377 The recording
and film industries, like other incumbents, have not shown an interest
in destroying online distribution. It is a question of control: the
industry would prefer to steward the arrival of online distribution
technology, so that it arrives on their schedule and creates collectible
revenue.378
While the basic question of online distribution is mainly a question
of communications policy, the rhetoric of authorship is nonetheless
pervasive. Early on, Metallica Drummer Lars Ulrich said he found
Napster "sickening," for use of Napster, in his view, constituted
"stealing" and was "morally and legally wrong. "379 On the other side,
artists like Public Enemy's Chuck D speak of the benefits of online
distribution as an authorship issue. In 2000, in Napster's glory days, he
wrote in the New York Times that artists "should think of it as a new
kind of radio - a promotional tool that can help artists who don't
have the opportunity to get their music played on mainstream radio or
on MTV . . . . The Internet has created a new planet for musicians to
explore, and I'm with that."380
What can the communications policy perspective tell us? On the
one hand, the recording industry's efforts to control online
distribution are a classic example of the vertical foreclosure discussed
in Part II. Online distribution is a rival technology to the recording
industry's existing distribution of compact discs. The industry would
like to use their control over copyright, an essential input, to control
how and when online distribution reaches consumers. From this
perspective the copyright lawsuits are suspect as a barrier to free
technological competition. But that is not the end of the analysis,
because unlike other technological challengers throughout history, it is
not at all clear that entities like Napster, Aimster, or KaZaA represent
legitimate market entrants. The complicated part is that peer-to-peer
file-sharing networks and online music distribution are not the same
thing: P2P networks are a particularly harmful form of online

375. See, e.g. , Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am., Inc. v. Verizon Internet Serv., Inc., 351
F.3d 1229, 1230 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (involving recording industry attempt to use subpoenas to
"unmask" alleged copyright infringers).
376. See Wu, When Code Isn 't Law, supra note 45, at 473-75 (describing extra-legal
methods used by the RIAA).
377. See Rick Boucher, Justice Department as antipiracy shill?, Oct. 30, 2003, CNET
NEWS.COM, at http:/lnews.com.com/2010-1028-5099583.html.
378. See, e.g. , Remarks of Preston Padden, Executive Vice-President, Disney, Silicon
Flatirons Telecommunications Conference Feb. 9 2003 (detailing film industry's plans to
introduce online distribution).
379. Metallica Press Release, Apr. 13, 2000.
380. Chuck D, 'Free' Music Can Free the Artist, N.Y. TIMES, April 29, 2000, at A13.
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distribution, at least as measured by the potential loss of revenue to
creators.
The communications policy perspective, in other words, sees
online distribution as a weighing of two costs, both difficult to assess.
On one side are the costs of the foreclosure, which are the forgone
benefits of the new technology and of disrupting the market power of
existing content industries. On the other side are the lost incentives for
new authors and value (if any) of the reliance interests in the property
rights guaranteed the copyright law. Weighing these two costs leads to
a spectrum of plausible policy positions on the question of online
content distribution, each of which reflects different views of national
communications policy. We can group them into three basic positions
(reflecting the policies described in Part II): open, stewarded, and
judicially balanced.
The open position is highly optimistic about the market and the
process of creative destruction. A strong proponent of an open
communications policy would give online distribution systems an
exemption from contributory copyright liability despite the fact that
they can be demonstrated to harm or even destroy authorial
incentives. The article of faith is that such action, however traumatic in
the short term for both disseminators and creators, will not destroy
authorial incentives in the long term. If that is correct, consumer
welfare will be served both in the short term (free content) and also
the long term (cheaper content). But how might authorial incentives
be restored? There are two possible accounts. First, there is faith that
the demands of the market will necessarily recreate authorial
incentives from somewhere, even if it is hard to specify where right
now. If an online distributor like KaZaA becomes a powerful
distributor of music, it will have a natural need to see its content
creators survive, and therefore create some mechanism for paying
authors. An alternative view places faith in the political process.
Exempting the P2P companies from copyright liability could force
some matters into copyright's classic communications regimes, forcing
a settlement that will liberate online music distribution.381
The Ninth Circuit's 2004 MGM v. Grokster decision adopts the
"open" policy in strong fashion.382 Judge Thomas's decision, if
affirmed by the Supreme Court and not annulled by Congress, would
create wide-open competition amongst music disseminators. As the
court stated in a crucial passage:

381. The propos1hon is contemplated in Neil Weinstock Netanel, Impose A
Noncommercial Use Levy To Allow Free Peer-To-Peer File Sharing, 17 HARV. J.L. & TECH.
1 (2003), and William Fisher, A Royalties Plan for File Sharing, July 11, 2003, CNET
NEWS.COM, at http://news.com.com/2102-1070-1_3-1024856.html.
382. See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 380 F.3d 1 154 (9th Cir.
2004).
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The introduction of new technology is always disruptive to old markets,
and particularly to those copyright owners whose works are sold through
well-established distribution mechanisms. Yet, history has shown that
time and market forces often provide equilibrium in balancing interests,
whether the new technology be a player piano, a copier, a tape recorder,
a video recorder, a personal computer, a karaoke machine, or an MP3
player.383

The court's view that the copyright market can correct any chaos
created by copyright infringement is a clear endorsement of a policy of
open market entry.
The diametric opposite to the radical open position is the
stewardship position. The open position's alleged faith in the political
process and free market does not impress proponents of a steward
based communications policy. In their view, copyright is property, and
property is a market precondition. To argue that the state should
allow an exemption to the enforcement of property rights to promote
the functioning of the market is a logical contradiction. The
stewardship view at its strongest also believes that the incumbent
industry can and should be trusted to introduce online dissemination
in an efficient and timely manner.384
In the P2P debate, the draft Induce Act, introduced in the summer
of 2004, embodies the stewardship position.385 The law created
copyright liability for anyone who "intentionally induces"
infringement of copyrighted works. The term "induces," moreover,
was defined to mean "aids, abets, induces, or procures" while the test
for "intention" was defined to include whether a party "relies on
infringement for its commercial viability." In short, the Act was
written to make the passive but knowing facilitation of copyright
infringement illegal, thereby making copyright owners the stewards
not of online music distribution, but possibly of other passive
distribution technologies as well.
The third view puts the j udiciary in charge of overseeing market
entry based on its assessment of harms. Unlike the stewarded view, it
sees incumbent control of a new technology as undesirable, yet is
sensitive, unlike the radically open view, to the destruction of creative
incentives. Hence it asks the judiciary to determine whether a pirate
industry is likely to become a legitimate market player. The effect is to
call for the greatest judicial involvement and oversight of the three
views described here. The radically open view would abandon the
future of content distribution to market forces or Congress, while the
stewardship view places the incumbent in a position to decide when

383. Id. at 1 167.
384. See supra Part II.B(2).
385. S. 2560, 108th Cong., 2d Sess.
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and how online distribution will arrive. But the intermediate position
in Napster and Aimster puts the federal judiciary in a position of
continuing supervision of the online distribution industry, waiting for
the moment that the pirate becomes legitimate.
The clearest example of this approach is Judge Richard Posner's
Aimster decision, which is unusually candid about the competitive
consequences of the case.386 The decision opens with a rejection of the
stewardship model as contrary to Sony: the recording industry had
argued that actual knowledge of any infringement was sufficient to
find liability. Posner rejects that position, saying it "could result in the
shutting down of the [distribution] service or its annexation by the
copyright owners (contrary to the clear import of the Sony
decision)."387 But Judge Posner is also unwilling to grant open ended
market entry to Aimster and similar online distribution systems.
Aimster's lawyers pressed for an interpretation that would essentially
mimic the results of Teleprompter: a holding that even potential of
legitimate uses are enough to create an exemption from copyright.
This view is also rejected: "It is not enough, as we have said, that a
product or service be physically capable, as it were, of a noninfringing
use."388
Instead, the Seventh Circuit lays out, in detail, what an online
content distribution system must do to gain market entry.389 The result
is slightly reminiscent of technologically specific communications
regulation. Judge Posner gives five examples of non-infringing uses
that, with substantial evidence, would make it a legitimate market
entrant under the Sony rule. His examples range from the obvious to
the slightly less so, including the distribution of uncopyrighted music
exchange as well as anonymous sharing of uncopyrighted photographs
and dirty jokes.390 The upshot is the decision puts the judiciary in the
role of deciding when the market entry has reached legitimacy.
As the Supreme Court reconsiders Sony in the context of online
content distribution, it faces the three policy options described here. It
can make market entry substantially easier with a broad exemption for
bold new pirate technologies, and hope that the market or Congress
will take care of the resultant chaos. It can hark back to the Bell
System, tighten incumbent control, and trust existing players to
introduce new technologies in a planned way. Or it can stick with the
Sony rule and its consequent involvement of the federal judiciary in
the weighing of the merit of new technological entrants. As the
386. In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2003).
387. Id. at 648-49.
388. Id. at 653.
389. Id. at 645-51.
390. See id. at 652-53.
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descriptions suggest, none of these options is particularly tidy. Yet the
history of copyright's communications policy gives us no reason to
expect clean solutions to conflicts among rival disseminators.
What the right answer is to the online distribution problem is hard
to say. But it is important that the courts be aware that their copyright
decisions are de facto setting a substantial and growing part of the
nation's communications policy. The instinct that what matters in
copyright is that authors be protected is not incorrect but simply an
insufficient accounting of the issues presented. For behind authorship
concerns lies a cycle of incumbent and challenger technologies that
will never end. The only question is how painful and costly the
transitions will be.
CONCLUSION
This Article has identified and described a dynamic that at once
underlies much of copyright law and yet is not considered part of
orthodox copyright theory. That dynamic is copyright's role in the
regulation of competing disseminators, and particularly new and
incumbent industries.
There is generous evidence of the effects of this dynamic in both
the history of copyright and the law itself. Some of the strongest
examples are the compulsory licensing settlements written directly
into the copyright law. But the question of copyright's effects on
competition among disseminators is evident in many of the important
doctrines of copyright. Concern for the competitive effects of
copyright underlies the fair use decisions on reverse engineering, some
of the copyright-contract discussions, and other matters. Today, the
dominant example is the Sony doctrine, which has been used by courts
as a gateway between authorship policy and communication policy: to
decide whether a court faces a problem of market entry, and whether
it needs to do something about it.
Many of these effects are not unknown to copyright theorists. The
principal goal of this paper has been to analytically consolidate these
scattered doctrines and to understand them as a de facto
communications policy. The secondary goal is to theorize copyright's
effects on competition among disseminators, to understand what
choices copyright decisions have, and what values the decisions are
promoting. As copyright law becomes more important, it is essential
that judges, lawmakers, and academics understand the effects of the
law on parties other than authors.

